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"The sergeant at arms will please close the doors." With these
words,' Chief Justice William Rehnquist2 implemented the will of the
United States Senate to debate in secret during the impeachment trial
of President William Jefferson Clinton.3 Although the American
public had direct television access to nearly every stage of the
impeachment process, the actual decision-making in this historic case
took place behind closed doors.
Before deliberations began on February 9, 1999, Texas Senator
Kay Bailey Hutchison confronted the Chief Justice with Senate
impeachment Rule XX,4 which creates a presumption in favor of
keeping the doors open to the public. Rehnquist, relying on Senate
precedent and the Senate parliamentarian's advice, ruled there could
be no deliberation by the Senate in open session, explaining:
The Chair is of the view that it would not be in order for this
reason: On the initial reading of Rules XX and XXIV of the
Senate impeachment rules, it would not appear to mandate that the
deliberations and debate occur in closed session, but only to permit
it.
But it is clear from a review of the history of the rules that the
committee that was established in 1868 to create the rules
specifically intended to require closed sessions for debate and
deliberation. Senator Howard reported the rules for the committee
* Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law, San Diego. B.A.
1970, Stanford University; J.D. 1975, Santa Clara University School of Law; co-author of
CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM: TELEVISION AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE,
McFarland, 1998. I would like to thank Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, Professor David
Steinberg, Dr. James Fife and Brent Bemau for their invaluable feedback and assistance
in the preparation of this article.
1. Although the official record contains a paraphrase of these words, see 145 CONG.
REC. S974 (1999), the Federal Document Clearing House version, see 1999 WL 27084
(F.D.C.H.), and this writer's simultaneous transcription as she viewed the January 25,
1999, proceeding on television, do contain these very words. It is not uncommon for the
Congressional Record to mis-transcribe the exact words of a proceeding. See, e.g., infra
note 5.
2. The Vice President of the United States generally presides over Senate
impeachment trials. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. In the case of Presidential
impeachment, however, the Chief Justice of the United States becomes Presiding Officer,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6, because the Vice President would become President if the
President was to be impeached and removed from office, thereby creating a conflict of
interest.
3. A motion to open Senate debate on Senator Robert C. Byrd's (D-Va.) motion to
dismiss the impeachment articles was defeated on January 25, 1999. See 145 CONG. REC.
S974 (1999). A similar motion to open debate on a motion to call witnesses was likewise
rejected on January 26, 1999. 145 CONG. REC. S1010 (1999). On February 9, 1999, the
Senate voted to deny public access to its final deliberations on the articles of
impeachment. See 145 CONG. REC. S1386-88 (1999).
4. See infra Part I.A.
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and clearly understated his [sic]5 intention, and Chief Justice Chase,
in the Andrew Johnson trial, stated in response to an inquiry,
"There can be no deliberation unless the doors are closed. There
can be no debate under the rules unless the doors be closed."
6
I understand from the Parliamentarian that it has been the
consistent practice of the Senate for the last 130 years in
impeachment trials to require deliberations and debate by the
Senate to be held in closed session. Therefore-though there may
be some ambiguity between the two rules-my ruling is based
partly on deference of the Senate's longstanding practice.
In the opinion of the Chair, there can be no deliberation on any
question before the Senate in open session unless the Senate
suspends its rules, or consent is granted.7
Rule V of the current Standing Rules of the United States Senate
allows for suspension of the rules by unanimous consent of the Senate
"except as otherwise provided by the rules." A precedent first
established in 1929 requires a "two-thirds vote of the Senators
present, a quorum being present," for suspension of the rules.
8
One month before the impeachment deliberations began, Senate
parliamentarian Robert B. Dove had told an interviewer,
"Deliberations in an impeachment trial are never open."9 This writer
questioned Dove one week prior to the deliberations about the
apparent presumption in Rule XX for openness in Senate
impeachment proceedings. He replied that when senators debate in
an impeachment trial, "the Senate follows precedent even if [Senate]
rules don't seem to support it." He cited "unbroken precedent" that
"debate always has been behind closed doors," and noted, "if
something has always been done in a certain way, we assume that's
how the Senate wants it done." Thus, the Chief Justice, attempting to
follow the Senate's own rules for impeachment, heeded the advice of
the official Senate parliamentarian, whose circular reasoning relates
back to the way it "has always been done."
That premise is challenged in this article through an examination
of the development of Senate impeachment rules and the precedent
of closed deliberations. Part I places the current impeachment rules
in an historical context. It chronicles the tradition of Senate secrecy
and the underpinnings of the rules governing impeachment. The
presumption of openness, which was codified in Rule XIX10 in 1804,
5. The word "this" was mis-transcribed in the Congressional Record as "his." It
should read, "clearly understated this intention."
6. See U.S. CONGRESS, 2 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 475 (1868).
7. 145 CONG. REC. S1387 (1999).
8. See Riddick's Senate Procedure, S.DOC. No. 101-28, at 1219.
9. Don Aucoin, Pre-TV Rules Could Black Out Senate's Deliberations, BOSTON
GLOBE, Jan. 6,1999, at A14.
10. Rule XIX was renumbered XX in 1935. See infra note 261.
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was reversed by the Senate during the 1868 impeachment trial of
President Andrew Johnson. This section provides an explanation for
that change. Part II describes impeachment as a political process
where Senators do not function as traditional jurors in a judicial
proceeding. This distinction drives the debate on whether
deliberations should be open to the public. Part III traces the advent
of direct election of senators, the legacy of Watergate and the
development of First Amendment jurisprudence, all of which have
made government officials more accountable to the public. Finally,
Part IV recommends a change to a conclusive rule of openness at
every stage of the impeachment process, including deliberations.
I. Impeachment Rules and Precedents
Like the brass spittoons that still adorn the Senate floor, the
impeachment trial of President Clinton is controlled by arcane rules
rooted in the 19th century.1'
One of those 19th century rules that opened each day's trial
session in the Clinton case, was the admonition of the sergeant at
arms: "All persons are commanded to keep silence, on pain of
imprisonment.' 2 Although the congressmen presenting the case for
conviction and Clinton's defenders were allowed to speak when
recognized by the Chief Justice, the senators, who would ultimately
judge the case, could not debate with one another during the
proceedings, except behind closed doors.13
A. Current Impeachment Rules
Rule XX of Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When
Sitting on Impeachment Trials provides in pertinent part: "At all
times while the Senate is sitting upon the trial of an impeachment the
doors of the Senate shall be kept open, unless the Senate shall direct
the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its decisions"
(emphasis added).14 Also cited by Rehnquist was Rule XXIV, which
11. Curt Anderson, Impeachment Trial Rules Date to 19th Century, AssOCIATED
PRESS, Jan. 12,1999, available in 1999 WL 308211.
12. Rule II, Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on
Impeachment Trials, Rules and Manual of the Senate, S. Res. 479, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986) (revised).
13. During secret Senate debates in the Clinton trial, senators quipped with journalists
about the consequences of revealing what took place behind closed doors. Senator Robert
Bennett (R-Utah) said, "If I tell you what happened, they hang me." Howard Kurtz,
News Media Sputter as Senate Slams the Door, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1999, at Col.
Another senator told a reporter, "If we told you what happened, we'd have to kill you."
Id They did, however, speak verbosely into the cameras outside the Senate chamber
during recesses. See infra Part II.E.
14. Rule XX further provides, "A motion to close the doors may be acted upon
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requires the Senate to go into secret session in order to debate any
issue that arises during the trial:
All the orders and decisions may be acted upon without objection,
or, if objection is heard, the orders and decisions shall be voted on
without debate by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the
record, subject, however, to the operation of Rule VII, except when
the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that case no
member shall speak more than once on one question, and for not
more than ten minutes on an interlocutory question, and for not
more than fifteen minutes on the final question, unless by consent
of the Senate, to be had without debate.'5
It is the view of this writer that Rule XX creates an unambiguous
rebuttable presumption in favor of open doors at every stage of the
impeachment proceeding. Nevertheless, the Senate has consistently
used the ambiguous and derivative Rule XXIV to close the doors to
the public during deliberations. In anticipation of the impeachment
trial of President Richard M. Nixon in 1974, Senate parliamentarian
without objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall be voted on without debate by
the yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record." S. Res. 479, supra note 12.
15. Id (emphasis added).
Rule VII, after empowering the Presiding Officer to direct preparations and forms of
proceedings for a Senate impeachment trial, reads:
[T]he Presiding Officer on the trial may rule on all questions of evidence
including, but not limited to, questions of relevancy, materiality, and redundancy
of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of
the Senate, unless some Member of the Senate shall ask that a formal vote be taken
thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the Senate for decision without
debate; or he may at his option, in the first instance, submit any such question to
a vote of the Members of the Senate. Upon all such questions the vote shall be
taken in accordance with the Standing Rules of the Senate.
S. Res. 479, supra note 12 (emphasis added).
The first motion to suspend the Senate impeachment rules and allow for open debate
in the Clinton trial was made by Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) on January 25, 1999. He
moved to suspend the following rules:
(1)The phrase "without debate" in Rule VII;
(2)The following portion of Rule XX: "unless the Senate shall direct the doors to
be closed while deliberating upon its decisions. A motion to close the doors
may be acted upon without objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion
shall be voted on without debate by the yeas and nays, which shall be
entered on the record;" and
(3)In Rule XXIV, the phrases "without debate," "except when the doors shall be
closed for deliberation, and in that case" and "to be had without debate."
145 CONG. REc. S974 (1999). The Senate proceeded on the assumption that a two-
thirds majority was necessary to open the Senate doors during debate. The motion
was defeated 57 to 43, failing to achieve a 2/3 majority. See supra note 3. The
following day, Harkin made an identical motion to debate in open session the motion
to call witnesses; this motion was likewise defeated, 58 to 41. See 145 CONG. REC.
Sl010 (1999). The motion to deliberate in open session was rejected, 59 to 41. See
145 CONG. REC. S1385-86 (1999). The Senate, in each of these three instances, then
voted by a simple majority to close the doors.
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Dove provided the official interpretation of the rules on closing the
doors during impeachment trials: "Senators do not debate in an
impeachment trial unless the Senate is sitting in closed session when
debate is allowed as provided in Rule XXIV.... Debate by Senators
on any question is not allowed in open session. '16 Dove does not
refer to Rule XX at this point in his guidelines for impeachment
trials. In order to assess Dove's advice, which has been the basis for
the Senate's practice since 1974, it is useful to examine how the
Senate proceeded historically in impeachment deliberations,
particularly in the only other presidential impeachment. This
necessitates an historical analysis of Senate secrecy, which set the
stage for the rules governing impeachment.
B. A Tradition of Senate Secrecy
(1) Congressional Rule-Making Authority
The Constitution empowers each house of Congress to
"determine the Rules of its Proceedings.' 7 It is up to the House and
the Senate to enact, modify or repeal their rules, or decide whether to
even abide by them. These rules have generally not been subjected to
judicial review.18
(2) The "Closed-Door Policy"
The original rules governing impeachment were enacted in the
1800s.19 Yet the practice of secret deliberations evolved from the
Senate's general "closed-door policy" which dates back to the late
18th century.20 The elitist Federalists, who comprised the majority
congressional party in the late 1700s, preferred to do their business
away from the public eye,21 while the populist Republicans pushed for
16. Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United States Senate, S.
Res. 439, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., at 42,47 (1986).
17. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 2. This provision was adopted, evidently without
debate, in 1787. See JAMES MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 385,
387-88, 431,616,618 (1987).
18. See Stanley Bach, The Nature of Congressional Rules, 5 J.L. & POL. 725, 730
(1989).
19. See discussion infra Part I.C.
20. The rules of the First Continental Congress in 1774 required Members "under the
strongest obligations of honour, to keep the proceedings secret until the majority shall
direct them to be made public." I JOURNALS OF CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 25-26 (1774),
quoted in ROY SWANSTROM, THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1787-1801), S. DOc. No.
100-31, at 238 (1988).
21. See SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 244.
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open Senate sessions.22 But some senators felt the closed-door
sessions enabled less acrimonious debate without the posturing
inherent in a public proceeding of government officials.2
The first standing rules of the Senate did not mention either
secrecy or closed or open doors.24 Not all closed-door sessions of the
Senate were necessarily secret.2 5  When the Senate wanted to
maintain secrecy, it would adopt a resolution to that effect. 26
Nevertheless, the un-public nature of Senate sessions, especially when
contrasted to those of the House of Representatives, engendered
resentment.27
Philip Freneau, editor of the Republican newspaper National
Gazette, appealing to public distrust of secrecy, embarked on a one-
man crusade to open Senate sessions, railing at one point, "Are you
freemen who ought to know the individual conduct of your
legislators, or are you an inferior order of beings incapable of
comprehending the sublimity of Senatorial functions, and unworthy
to be entrusted with their opinions?" 28
Senators fancied themselves the aristocracy of this young
country,29 and the fact they were not popularly elected 30 was both the
cause and effect of this self-concept. The policy of secrecy
engendered more criticism than any other action by the Senate during
22. See DONALD A. RITCHIE, PRESS GALLERY: CONGRESS AND THE WASHINGTON
CORRESPONDENTS 9 (1991). Republican Senator Charles Pinckney protested, "Public
bodies are public property; and so indeed are public men." 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 78
(1800).
23. See RITCHIE, supra note 22, at 164; SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 243-44.
Opponents of an open door policy argued newspaper reports were inaccurate. ld.
Senators sitting in judgment of Bill Clinton two centuries later made similar observations.
See discussion infra Part I.E.
24. See SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 238.
25. The Constitution requires each house of Congress to "keep a Journal of its
Proceedings," which it shall publish from time to time, "excepting such Parts as may in
their Judgment require Secrecy." See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
26. See SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 239.
27. See id at 240.
28. Gerald L. Grotta, Philip Freneau's Crusade for Open Sessions of the U.S. Senate,
JOURNALISM Q., Winter 1971, at 669.
29. See SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 67.
30. See infra Part III.A. When the Constitutional Convention had threatened to break
up over how federal legislators would be elected, the Founding Fathers settled on what
became known as the Great Compromise of a bicameral Congress. Delegate Thomas
Johnson formulated the rationale for the two houses when he stated that "in some respects
the States are to be considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of
individual citizens, the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to
each other, ought to be combined; that in one branch [the House] the people, ought to be
represented; in the other [the Senate] the States." THOMAS A. BAILEY, THE AMERICAN
PAGEANT 140-41 (3d ed. 1966); PAGE SMrrH, THE CONSTITUTION-A DOCUMENTARY
AND NARRATIVE HISTORY 175 (1978).
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its first five years.31 Critics charged the Senate with acting in a
monarchical fashion, hatching dark anti-Republican plots behind
closed doors.32
Secret Senate sessions generated increasing suspicion in the
minds of the people and the press. 33 The Federalists came to feel that
opening the doors might well expose the wisdom of their programs to
the public and prevent the Republicans from gaining control of the
Senate.34 In 1794, partly as a result of Freneau's campaign and afraid
a secret debate would generate accusations of a Star Chamber, the
Federalists opted for an open session to debate the credentials of
Republican Senator-elect Albert Gallatin.35 A gallery for the public
was constructed the following year.36 The Senate's resolution, which
provoked bitter debate among the senators,37 provided:
Resolved, That, after the end of the present session of Congress,
and, so soon as suitable galleries shall be provided for the Senate
31. See SWANSTROM, supra note 20.
32. See idL at 68. It must be noted, however, that the Senate adopted the closed-door
policy with very little opposition, following the lead of its predecessor, the Congress of the
Confederation. See id. at 68, 238. The Bank of the United States, considered by many the
"monster" conceived to enhance the rich at the expense of the poor, engendered
additional criticism, as it was created behind the closed doors of the Senate. See id. at 241.
Fenno's Gazette of the United States quoted a correspondent who rhythmically penned a
biting criticism of the closed Senate debates:
From the dark conclave, close confin'd,
Hydras and gorgons haunt the mind;
To clear away all fear and doubt,
They ought to "let the darkness out!"
Bright rays will then dart from below,
As all their rapid movements show.
See id at 243. "Below" evidently refers to the House of Representatives, whose chamber
was located on the floor below the Senate. The verbosity-and thus inertia--of the House
members is ridiculed: "their rapid movements." See id.
33. See RrrCHIE, supra note 22, at 9; SWANSTRoM, supra note 20, at 239.
34. See SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 243. In the Third Congress, the Republicans
had captured control of the House. See id. Freneau continued to rant in his National
Gazette about Senate secrecy. In his final attack, he argued the internal threat to
democracy was greater than that of a foreign power. He wrote, "shutting the doors of the
legislature upon the people, and excluding private citizens from their tables" was
"dangerous to liberty and entirely inconsistent with the principle of a free government."
GROTTA, supra note 28, at 670.
35. See SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 246. Noted Senate historian Roy Swanstrom
feels this decision, more than any other event, illustrates the Senate's "adjustment to its
permanent role as the first of two equal branches of Congress." See id. at 238.
36. See id. at 670-671; RITCHIE, supra note 22.
37. John Adams, in a letter to his wife, wrote of this resolution: "What the effect of
this measure, which was at last carried by a great majority, will be, I know not: but it
cannot produce greater evils than the contest about it, which was made an engine to
render unpopular some of the ablest and most independent members." I ADAMS WORKS
467 (1794), quoted in SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 247.
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Chamber, the said galleries shall be permitted to be opened every
morning, so long as the Senate shall be engaged in their legislative
capacity, unless in such cases as may in the opinion of the Senate
require secrecy, after which the said galleries shall be closed.
38
Nevertheless senators often continued to meet in secret session
throughout the 19th century. They liked to unbutton their vests, light
up cigars and stretch out on the leather couches in the Senate
chamber.39 Senators frequently debated treaties and nominations
behind closed doors and Congressional committees convened in
executive session.4° The secrecy enhanced the Senate's power over
treaties,41 enabling them to amend, revise and reject them with
abandon.42
When, in 1794, the Senate had considered and approved the Jay
Treaty in executive session, the public outcry was deafening: "Thus it
is with the Senate. They undertake to deliberate and decide upon
what is best for the people, and what shall govern them, without
giving them an opportunity of exercising an opinion upon a subject of
the most supreme importance to them. '43
Notwithstanding criticism of the process by which the Jay Treaty
was enacted, there was no great rush of spectators to witness Senate
sessions after construction of the new gallery.44 When Congress
moved to the new Capitol in Washington, reporters had difficulty
hearing debates on the Senate floor well enough to report them
accurately from the remote gallery.45
38. 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 46 (1794), quoted in SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 247.
39. See RrrCHIE supra note 22, at 164.
40. See id.
41. The Constitution empowers the President to make Treaties "with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate." U.S. CONST., art. 2, § 2, cl. 2.
42. Not a single treaty was approved by the Senate between 1869 and 1890. See
RITCHIE, supra note 22, at 163. John Hay said, "A treaty entering the Senate is like a bull
going into the arena; no man can say just how or when the final blow will fall, but one
thing is certain-it will never leave the arena alive." GEORGE H. HAYNES, 2 THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 270 (1938).
43. See SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 248-49. The treaty aimed to settle important
post-Revolutionary geographical, commercial and navigational matters between Britain
and the United States. Opposition had as much to do with political differences over the
treaty as the process by which it was adopted. The Republicans opposed treaties with
Great Britain in general, and particularly this one negotiated by Jay, perceived as
surrendering cherished American rights. See id. at 249.
44. See SWANSTROM, supra note 20, at 249.
45. Samuel Harrison Smith, editor of the Universal Gazetter, lobbied for a Senate
policy to admit journalists to the floor of the Senate. Opposition from the Federalists,
who no longer controlled the Senate, failed to defeat the resolution. It applied to "any
stenographer, or note-taker, desirous to take the debates of the Senate on Legislative
business." Id Smith said of the resolution:
On the adoption of the above resolution, which opens a new door to public
information, and which may be considered as the prelude to a more genuine
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No one wanted the cloak of secrecy lifted more than the press.46
Journalists were forced to rely on rumors from their favorite senators
about what had transpired in secret sessions. 47 The issue crystallized
with the dismissal of Senate executive clerk James Rankin Young. In
1862, secret debates on a Bering Sea treaty with Great Britain were
published by newspapers, including the Philadelphia Star, for which
Young frequently wrote. He came under suspicion and was fired in a
secret Senate session with no opportunity to defend himself.48 Many
thought the leaks had actually come from the "senators themselves. 49
The 1868 impeachment rules, a child of their times, reflected the
general "closed door" policy of the Senate during this period.
(3) The Twentieth Century: The Door Opens Wider
By the time Young died in 1924, Senate reformers from both
political parties were crusading to open the doors of the Senate
chamber to the public50 The controversy came to a head in 1929,
with the publication of a secret Senate vote approving President
Herbert Hoover's nomination of former Senator Irvine Lenroot to
the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.51
In the months leading up to the Great Depression, the Senate
found itself embroiled in the issue of farm relief. Senator Robert La
Follette, Jr., heir to his late father's Senate seat, became involved in a
heated battle over President Herbert Hoover's support for a self-help
plan for the nation's farmers. Hoover favored the creation of a
federal farm board to help farmers organize and market their food
more efficiently; but La Follette, thinking the plan did not go far
enough, voted against it. Nevertheless, Congress passed the
Agricultural Marketing Act. 52
During the debate on farm relief, La Follette seized upon the
Lenroot matter to raise the issue of Senate secrecy. The rule against
disclosure of secret Senate proceedings had proven ineffective in
sympathy between the Senate and the people of the United States, than may
have heretofore subsisted, by rendering each better acquainted with the other,
we congratulate, every friend to the true principles of our republican institutions.
Id
46. The New York Times labeled it the Senate's "un-American executive session." See
RITCHIE, supra note 22, at 165.
47. See id. at 29.
48. See iL at 169, 173.
49. See id. at 174.
50. See RITCHIE, supra note 22, at 175-76.
51. See id. at 175-78; PATRICK J. MANEY, "YOUNG BOB" LA FOLLETTE: A
BIOGRAPHY OF ROBERT M. LA FOLLETTE, JR., 1895-1953,63-65 (1978).
52. See 71 CONG. REc. 3396 (1929); MANEY, supra note 51, at 63; RITCHIE, supra
note 22, at 176.
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practice. Senators frequently revealed these confidences to their
favorite members of the press, who in turn reported them in the
newspapers. 53 Several days after the Senate approved Lenroot's
nomination in executive session, United Press reporter Paul R.
Mallon wrote a story describing the deliberations and divulging the
names of those senators who had voted for Lenroot.54 The front-page
headline in May, 1929, read: "Senate's Secret Vote on Lenroot
Revealed: Nine Democrats Bolt-Breaking of Party Ties Gives
Former Senator Majority of 42 to 27." 55 Mallon's tally, however, was
erroneous. The actual vote had been 42 to 26; three senators,
including one of the "bolters," had not voted; and two others he had
listed as absent had voted for Lenroot.56
LaFollette was a political opponent of Lenroot, who had lost his
Senate seat after falling out of favor with Wisconsin's powerful La
Follette family. Progressive Republicans opposed Lenroot's
nomination, accusing him of lobbying for power companies. Smarting
from their loss in the Lenroot affair, they turned to the volatile issue
of Senate secrecy.57 After Mallon's erroneous headline appeared, the
reformers seized upon it as evidence that open Senate sessions would
ensure accuracy in the press.58
"Young Bob" La Follette echoed Philip Freneau's sentiments
150 years earlier, that the press and public should have access to their
government. La Follette stated, "The conflict between secrecy and
publicity has gone forward through the ages," and quoted his late
father, who had said, "Evil and corruption thrive best in the dark."59
On June 18, 1929, four months before "Black Tuesday"-the day
the stock market crashed, inaugurating the Depression-the Senate
voted to reverse the presumption for Senate secrecy. Henceforth, all
executive business would be considered in open session, unless the
Senate specifically voted to close the meeting. 6°
53. See MANEY, supra note 51, at 63.
54. See id.
55. See RITCHME, supra note 22, at 175.
56. See 68 SENATE JOURNAL OF EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS 88 (Wash. 1931). 71
CONG. REC. 1598,1624; RrrcHIE, supra note 22, at 175.
57. See RrrcHME, supra note 22, at 175.
58. See id at 176.
59. Id at 177; MANEY, supra note 51, at 64.
60. See 71 CONG. REC. 3048-3055 (1929); RITCHIE, supra note 22, at 177-78; MANEY,
supra note 51, at 64-65. The resolution provided:
Resolved, That paragraph 2 of Rule XXXVIII of the Standing Rules of the
Senate, relating to proceedings or nominations in executive session, be, and the
same is hereby, amended to read as follows:
"2. Hereafter, all business in the Senate shall be transacted in open session
unless the Senate in closed session, by a majority vote, shall determine that a
particular nomination, treaty, or other matter shall be considered in closed
January 2000] OPEN-AND-SHUT
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Since 1929, the Senate has held fifty-three closed-door sessions,
when it discussed impeachment, classified matters and national
defense issues.61
(4) When the Doors Are Closed
The rule governing the procedures to be utilized when the Senate
goes into executive session includes a penalty for public disclosure of
matters discussed in secret proceedings. It provides:
Any Senator, officer, or employee of the Senate who shall disclose
the secret or confidential business or proceedings of the Senate,
including the business and proceedings of the committees,
subcommittees, and offices of the Senate, shall be liable, if a
Senator, to suffer expulsion from the body; and if an officer or
employee, to dismissal from the service of the Senate, and to
punishment for contempt.62
When the Senate meets in closed session, the records of that
proceeding are sealed for a minimum of twenty years, unless the
Senate votes to open them sooner. On particularly sensitive issues,
such as national security or impeachment, it is common for such
executive session, in which case all subsequent proceedings with respect to said
nomination, treaty, or other matter shall be kept secret: Provided, That the
injunction of secrecy as to the whole or any part of proceedings in closed
executive session may be removed on motion adopted by a majority vote of the
Senate in closed executive session: Provided further, That Rule XXXV shall
apply to open executive sessions: And provided further, that any Senator may
make public his vote in closed executive session.
"Anything in the rules of the Senate inconsistent with the foregoing is hereby
repealed."
71 CONG. REC. 3055 (1929) (emphasis in original).
Paragraph 2 of Rule XXXVIII, as amended in 1929, is now codified in rule XXXI. It
is identical, except the following language from the 1929 rule was deleted in 1979:
"Provided further, that Rule XXXV shall apply to open executive sessions."
Rule XXXV, as it appeared in 1929, has now been codified in Rule XXI:
On a motion made and seconded to close the doors of the Senate, on the
discussion of any business which may, in the opinion of a Senator, require
secrecy, the Presiding Officer shall direct the galleries to be cleared; and during
the discussion of such motion the doors shall remain closed.
61. Communication with Betty Koed, Senate Historian (June 24, 1999). Examples of
matters debated in closed sessions include: Chemical weapons convention, 143 CONG.
REc. S3567-8 (1997); International Monetary Fund, 135 CONG. REC. 5452 (1992); Most
Favored Nation Treatment to the Products of the Peoples Republic of China, 138 CONG.
REC. 2166 (1992); Neutron Bomb, 123 CONG. REC. 22007 (1977); Trident submarine, 119
CONG. REC. 31303 (1973); Panama Canal Treaty, 124 CONG. REc. 3916, 3967, 4103
(1978); U.S. involvement in Laos, 117 CONG. REC. 18401-2 (1971); Impeachment trial
deliberations in Alcee Hastings case, 135 CONG. REC. S2802, S13751 (1989) and Walter
Nixon case, 135 CONG. REC. S14561 (1989).
62. Rule XXIX, § 5, Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No. 104-8 (101-1)(1996).
During the impeachment trial of President Clinton, senators were well aware of the
penalty for violation of this rule of secrecy. See supra note 13.
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records to be closed for fifty years.63 For example, closed session
records from the impeachment trials of three judges in the 1980s have
been sealed for fifty years. The Senate can vote to change these
access rules at any time. After fifty years, the Senate can vote to open
the records or to keep them sealed even longer.64 The deliberations
in President Andrew Johnson's impeachment trial were unrecorded
as well as secret.65
C. Historical Impeachment Rules
The first impeachments under the Constitution did not operate
according to rules of procedure developed specifically to reflect the
circumstances and ethos of a republican form of government.
Instead, they followed rules based on the precedents of English
parliamentary impeachments, particularly those leading up to the
English Civil War. This is evident in Section LIII of Thomas
Jefferson's Manual,66  dealing with Senate procedure during
impeachment trials, where Jefferson reviews English precedents
rather than formulating new rules in accord with the nature of the
U.S. Constitution. Thus in the first impeachment attempt, against
Senator William Blount in 1797, the Senate adopted rules based
primarily on the English model of procedure.67 Likewise, during the
impeachment of Judge John Pickering in 1803, the Senate utilized ad
hoc rules derived from English precedent. 68
However, the following year, with the highly contentious and
politicized impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase, the Senate adopted
a new set of 19 standing rules which became the basis of the body's
impeachment procedure from that time on. 69 The Chase rules
remained in force-although not formally re-adopted each time-for
the two subsequent impeachments of Judges James Peck and West
63. But see infra Part .E, describing the decision by the Senate to enable individual
senators to release their own statements given behind closed doors during deliberation at
Clinton's impeachment trial.
64. Email from Betty K. Koed, Assistant Historian, U.S. Senate Historical Office
(May 19,1999).
65. See David Stout, What the Senators Say They Said, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1999, at
A22.
66. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE FOR THE USE
OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES § LIII (1801).
67. See 8 ANNALS OF CONG. 2196 (1798). The fact that members of Congress first
interpreted the Constitution's impeachment procedure as applicable to legislators such as
Sen. Blount as well as executive officers shows that they very much had in mind a
parliamentary model of impeachment rather than one suited to the role of checks and
balances of the separate branches which characterizes the American system of
government.
68. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 326 (1803).
69. See 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 89-92 (1804).
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Humphreys in 1830 and 1862 respectively.70
The original Rule XIX, relating to the public nature of the trial,
stated simply: "At all times, whilst the Senate is sitting upon the trial
of an impeachment, the doors of the Senate Chamber shall be kept
open."171 Rule XIX's insistence on a fully public proceeding was not
mere rhetoric or theory, but a considered decision made after
experience with a cumbersome and contentious closed-door
requirement in the Pickering trial. The Senate had adopted rules in
that trial which required all decisions be made in open session, but
without debate; debate could be held only if one-third of the senators
requested closed-door consultation.72
When, on the third day of the trial, the Federalists brought a
motion which "[t]o the majority.. .was an accusation that they were
attempting to conduct an ex parte prosecution," 73 the Republicans
sought to invoke cloture and then refused to allow the doors to be
closed so that the motion could be debated. When one puzzled
senator asked for clarification of the Federalists' proposal, it was
pointed out that a discussion was not allowed in open session. So the
senator reversed his vote on closing the doors in order to permit a
colloquy on the subject.
During the closed-door discussion, the rancor at the
Republicans' attempt to remove Pickering in what the Federalists
viewed as a "mock trial" boiled over to the extent that one senator
challenged another to a duel.74 Nonetheless the majority voted to
return to open session, effectively ending debate on the original
motion, which was promptly voted down. 5 The Chase impeachment
followed hard on the heels of the Pickering trial76 and it is no wonder
that, with this recent memory of the acrimonious and clumsy effect of
a "closed-door debate" rule, the Senate opted for a presumption of
openness during all proceedings, which it codified as Rule XIX.77
This rule of openness, which had been in effect since 1804,
70. See S. JOUR., 21st Cong., 1st Sess. 296 (1830); CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.
2946 (1862).
71. See supra note 69, at 92.
72. See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 327 (1804).
73. See IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND ERROR 50 (1972).
74. See id- at 51-52; WILLIAM PLUMER, MEMORANDUM OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE
UNITED STATES SENATE 1803-1807, 174-75 (Everett Brown ed., 1923).
75. See BRANT, supra note 73, at 51-52.
76. The same day the Senate took its final vote on Pickering, the House voted to
impeach Justice Chase. See EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL & PAUL FINKELMAN,
IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY FROM 1787 TO THE PRESENT 101
(1999).
77. The deliberations on the Chase impeachment, however, actually took place behind
closed doors, PETER CHARLES HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA,
1635-1805, 252 (1984), in keeping with the tradition of Senate secrecy, see supra Part I.B.
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changed suddenly in 1868 when the Congress impeached President
Andrew Johnson. A select committee of seven senators-six
Republicans and one Democrat-was charged with reviewing the
impeachment procedures. The committee reported a set of rules
which expanded those in effect during the Chase impeachment. Rule
XIX was modified to add a clause at the end, reading "unless the
Senate shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its
decisions." 78  One of the new rules prohibited debate on rulings
"except when the doors shall be closed for deliberation. ' 79 The new
set of rules was adopted independently in legislative session, and then
again when the Senate met as a court of impeachment.80 Like the
Chase rules, the 1868 rules were then used without formal re-
adoption at subsequent impeachment trials.8'
In 1935, however, the rules underwent a major alteration when
Rule XI, allowing for trial committees was added.82 All three
subsequent judicial impeachment trials have used this streamlined
procedure. 83 The latest codification of the impeachment rules dates
from the 93rd Congress, which reprinted them with modifications in
1986.84 President Clinton's trial was conducted according to this set of
rules.
It was in 1986 that the last part of rule XX was added: "A
78. See U.S. CONGRESS, 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 14 (1868).
79. Id, Rule XXIII. This rule was renumbered XXIV in 1935. See infra note 82.
80. See Stanley Futterman, The Rules of Impeachment, 24 U. KAN. L. REV. 105, n.4(1975).
81. The 1868 rules were used in the impeachment trials of Secretary of War Belknap,
see 4 CONG. REC. 1570 (1876), and Judges Swayne, see 39 CONG. REC. 1819 (1905),
Archbald, see 48 CONG. REC. 9075 (1912), Louderback, see 77 CONG. REC. 1470 (1933),
and Ritter see 80 CONG. REc. 3648-49 (1936). An attempt in 1876 to amend what is now
Rule XX, to exclude the option of closed sessions for the trial of Belknap, failed. See 4
CONG. REC. 2816,2847-48,2867-69, Supp. 41 (1876).
82. Rule XIX was renumbered XX at this time. S. Doc. No. 73-192 (1934); S. Doc.
No. 74-258 (1936).
Rule XI allows the Senate to commit the fact-finding aspect of the impeachment trial
to an Evidentiary Committee, which can report on the evidence but cannot recommend
conviction or acquittal to the full Senate. See Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate
When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, supra note 12. The purpose of the rule is to keep the
consideration of judicial impeachment from disrupting the normal course of business in
the Senate. See MARY L. VOLCANSEK, JUDICIAL IMPEACHMENT 54 (1993). The rule was
first invoked in the impeachment of Judge Harry Claibore in 1986. See Rose Anslander,
Note, Impeaching the Senate's Use of Trial Committees, 67 N.Y. U. L.REv. 68,76 (1992).
83. The three recent impeachment trials in the Senate referred initially to trial
committees under rule XI were those of Judge Claiborne in 1986, Judge Alcee Hastings in
1988 and Judge Walter Nixon in 1989. See VOLCANSEK, supra note 82, at 54-61, 107-13,
147-49. The final debate on the Senate floor was ordered closed in all three instances. See
132 CONG. REC. S15759 (1986); 135 CONG. REC. 52802, S14561 (1989); VOLCANSEK,
supra note 82, at 62-63,114-15,150.
84. See S. Res. 439,99th Cong., S. DOC. No. 93-102 (1986).
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motion to close the doors may be acted upon without objection, or, if
objection is heard, the motion shall be voted on without debate by the
yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the record."85 This revision
codified the Senate precedents under the existing rules, which had
been interpreted as forbidding debate in open session. During the
Andrew Johnson trial, for example, Chief Justice Salmon Chase cast
the tie-breaking vote to enable the Senate to deliberate behind closed
doors. For all practical purposes, the revision blends the precedents
with unanimous consent procedures. Thus, the Senate, upon proper
motion, may proceed behind closed doors unless a senator objects, in
which case the yeas and nays shall be ordered.86
Rule XXIV, which deals with voting on orders and decisions and
the procedure for closing the doors in order to deliberate, was
amended at the same time to conform to the revision of rule XX. In
place of the language "All orders and decisions shall be made and had
by yeas and nays," the following was substituted "All orders and
decisions may be acted upon without objection, or if objection is
heard, the orders and decisions shall be voted on without debate 'by
yeas and nays."' Non-controversial orders and decisions could be
dispensed with without objections; if a senator objected, the orders
and decisions would be voted on without debate if the doors were
open.87 The change to rule XXIV is thus wholly derivative from
language in rule XX.
D. Why Did the Presumption of Openness Change in 1868 with the
Andrew Johnson Impeachment?
What happened in 1868 to justify a change in the rule of
openness which had been on the books since 1804? The politics of
the times account for the differences in the way public accountability
was prioritized during these two historical periods. At the turn of the
19th century, there was a fundamental disagreement between the
majority Republican party and the Federalists about the role public
opinion should play in national politics.88 The Federalists, who at that
time favored a strong federal government, were reluctant to subject it
to public scrutiny. The Republicans, however, with their fear of the
tyranny of centralized government, preferred it be accountable to the
people; they felt that more information in the hands of the people
would increase the chance they would sympathize with Republican
85. Id.
86. See S. Res. 439, 99th Cong., S. REP. No. 99-401 (1986), at 9-10.
87. S. REP. NO. 99-401, at 10.
88. See RICHARD BUEL JR., SECURING THE REvOLUTION: IDEOLOGY IN
AMERICAN POLITICS, 1789-1815,89, 91 (1972).
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policies.89
Ultimately, all the Federalist senators voted "Not Guilty" on the
Chase articles of impeachment. 9° Justice Samuel Chase was acquitted
after closed door deliberations, 91 notwithstanding rule XIX's
presumption in favor of open proceedings.
The change in attitude from 1804 to 1868, which occasioned a
formal reversal in the presumption contained in rule XIX, may be
attributable to the fact that the 1868 trial involved the first
presidential impeachment. The senators of the 40th Congress also
had a special inclination to avoid public scrutiny of the process.
Congress itself was badly lopsided in 1868. Opponents of the
President could count on what appeared to be an unshakable
Republican majority in Congress. The Senate in particular was
stacked by the Northern states and the electoral landscape had been
effectively gerrymandered to exclude the heartland of Johnson's
Democratic party.92
Under these conditions, the Senate might well favor a closed-
door procedure as a way of muting the obviously one-sided nature of
the proceedings. Putting the deliberations in the public limelight
would reveal the undemocratic lack of a meaningful opposition,
emphasize the de jure exclusion from representation of a significant
portion of the country and draw attention to factional splits in the
89. See iL at 91-92; see also WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS-THE
HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW
JOHNSON 29 (1992). Thomas Jefferson, a Republican who sought to build an inclusive
party, unlike the Federalists who opted for a more exclusive body, i at 53-54, wrote:
"The way to prevent [errors of] the people, is to give them full information of their affairs
through the channel of the public papers, and to contrive that those papers should
penetrate the whole mass of the people." HAROLD LASSWELL, NATIONAL SECURITY
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 63 (1950). Ironically, it was Jefferson who first suggested
that Federalist Justice Chase be impeached for the latter's injection of his own political
views-views inimical to those of the Republicans-into his charge to a grand jury. See
REHNQUIST, supra, at 21, 97-98. The articles of impeachment leveled against Chase
involved "arbitrary, unjust and oppressive" behavior in conducting trials, improperly
instructing a grand jury and subjecting a grand jury to a "political harangue." VAN
TASSEL & FINKELMAN, supra note 76, at 102.
90. See i at 113.
91. HOFFER & HULL, supra note 77, at 237.
92. One-fourth of the electoral votes cast in the 1860 election resided in the southern
states that were barred from Congress. In ten of these states, Lincoln had not polled a
single popular or electoral vote. Only three states that had voted Democratic in the last
pre-war Presidential election were represented in Congress in 1868. Prior to secession, the
Republicans controlled neither house of Congress. See BAILEY, supra note 30, at 410-11.
The composition of the House of Representatives in 1868 was 143 Republicans and 49
Democrats; the Senate had 42 Republicans and 11 Democrats. See also CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY, GUIDE TO CONGRESS 897 (3d ed. 1982). The Republicans therefore began
the impeachment process with a better than two-thirds majority.
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Republican party in an election year.93
Another crucial element that might explain the rules changes was
Andrew Johnson's acrimonious relationship with Congress. Johnson
was a life-long Jacksonian Democrat. But when the secession crisis
arose, he was staunchly in favor of the Union and the only Southerner
to retain his Senate seat even after the legislature of his home state of
Tennessee voted to join the Confederacy.
Johnson's unwavering pro-Union position and active efforts to
restore Tennessee to federal authority were approved of by leading
Republicans; the Radicals were initially glad that someone like
Johnson, who hated the Southern aristocracy, would be taking over
from Lincoln, but this soon changed.94 A few months after Lincoln's
reelection, he was assassinated and Andrew Johnson became
President.
Johnson's politics were roundly condemned by the Radical
Republicans who had originally thought of him as one of their own.
Although he was an uncompromising Unionist, Johnson nevertheless
shared the strong racist attitudes of most Democrats and had even
owned slaves himself. He vetoed bills that would have helped the
newly freed slaves, and enabled Confederate states to rejoin the
Union without guaranteeing equal rights for blacks. These states
enacted "black codes," which changed the freed slaves into
indentured servants who still worked the plantations.95 This was
utterly at odds with the Radical philosophy. It also fed misgivings
about Johnson's leniency toward the South, even though his plan for
readmission to the Union differed little from Lincoln's.96
Considered soft on the rebels and hostile toward the ex-slaves,
Johnson and the Congress soon diverged sharply. Eventually
Johnson became labeled "Sir Veto" and viewed as obstructionist and
contrary. During his term in office, fifteen of Johnson's vetoes were
overridden, more than any other President. These included the law
he was eventually charged with violating, the Tenure of Office Act.97
93. The Radicals, though constituting a majority in their own right, had to contend
with powerful conservative forces within their party which opposed impeachment; this
major rift was evident in the failure of the first impeachment attempt in December, 1867.
See HANS L. TREFOUSSE, IMPEACHMENT OF A PRESIDENT: ANDREW JOHNSON, THE
BLACKS, AND RECONSTRUCTION 112-14 (1975). For a description of how the pro-labor,
pro-civil rights, anti-business Radicals differed from the emerging Republican mainstream,
see ERIc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION, 1863-1877,
228-39 (1988).
94. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 93, at 7-9.
95. See HOWARD ZINN, A PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES-1942-
PRESENT 194 (Harper Perennial 1995) (1980).
96. The plan provided that a state could be readmitted to the Union if 10 percent of its
eligible voters swore allegiance to the United States.
97. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 93, at 67-84, 115-30.
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Given the waning enthusiasm for Radicalism in the country in
1868,98 the Senate leaders wanted to obscure as much as possible the
political and personal agenda behind the accusations against Johnson.
Still smarting from the 1867 rebuff,99 they hardly wished to alienate
the electorate further with more Radical machinations leading up to
the presidential elections in 1868. Closed-door deliberations would
insulate the public from the Radical dogmas and personality clashes
driving the impeachment effort.
The political nature of the impeachment was also evident on
examining the charges brought against Johnson. The centerpiece
accusation against Johnson was his alleged violation of the Tenure in
Office Act.1°° The Act forbade the President from removing a federal
officer, including Cabinet members, without the consent of Congress.
The purpose of the Act was to stem the rupture in party patronage
that had occurred during the 1866 election campaign when Democrat
Johnson fired over a thousand federal employees for political
reasons.101 This was designed principally to protect the leading
Radical left in the administration, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton.10
Stanton was like a spy in the Cabinet for the Radicals. Johnson,
convinced the law was unconstitutional, fired Stanton on August 12,
1867.103
It is generally acknowledged that this primary accusation against
Johnson was purely political.' 4 Violation of the Tenure of Office Act
98. The state elections in 1867 were considered a significant defeat for the Radicals,
with important Democratic gains. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 93, at 90-91; MICHAEL LES
BENEDICT, THE IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 69-70 (1973).
99. See supra note 93.
100. 14 Stat. 430, c. 154 (1867).
101. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 93, at 43-44.
102. See id., at 44-45; JAMES M. MCPHERSON, ORDEAL BY FIRE: THE CIVIL WAR AND
RECONSTRUC'ION 523 (1982).
103. See TREFOUSSE, supra note 93, at 81-82.
104. In the historiography of the Johnson impeachment, scholars have swung from
antipathy toward the Radicals to sympathy with them and their progressive mission of
ensuring civil rights to the ex-slaves, depending on the historian's position as a
'traditionalist' or 'revisionist' toward Reconstruction policy. See KENNETH M. STAMPP,
THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION 1865-1877 217-21 (1965), for a discussion of these
schools. The view on the Radicals' motives in the impeachment tends to follow the same
course. Even so, very few, even among the revisionists, view the charges made against
Johnson as warranting removal from office. Cf. BENEDICT, supra note 98, at 168-80,
(concluding there were indeed grounds for a conviction) and TREFOUSSE, supra note 93,
at 159, another revisionist, (stating that "Reconstruction was the overriding issue.") in
light of the dubious legality and the patent political motives of the Tenure of Office Act.
David Donald, Why They Impeached Andrew Johnson, 8 AMERICAN HERITAGE 21, 103
(1956), concludes that the Radicals did not act out of fanatical vindictiveness, but in a
calculated political move to stem the growth of southern anti-Reconstruction power in
that year's elections. One need not accept traditional views of the Radicals as fanatics to
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was the excuse to go after Johnson. The law had "doubtful
constitutionality at best" and is better characterized as an assault on
executive powers, not a defense of legislative ones.105 Indeed, some
sixty years after the impeachment drama was resolved, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the basic principles upon which Johnson had
opposed the law as unconstitutional.1' 6 The Radicals, concerned
about the immediate and concrete issues of Reconstruction and other
public policy matters,10 7 were motivated by unabashed partisan
politics.108
To conceal the essentially political nature of the attack on
Johnson and the dubious constitutionality of the alleged "high
crime," 0 9 a closed-door debate would be most appealing to the
Senate leadership in 1868. Public scrutiny of the deliberations would
expose the real motivations and further discredit the Radicals.
Pressure to convict was exerted on all Republicans straddling the
fence or those who voted for the defense during the trial. As the trial
progressed, the certainty of a conviction began to fade. While Wade
remained confident enough in success that he began to outline the
members of his Cabinet," 0 it became clear that some Republicans had
also recognize their less than democratic methods. Revisionist historians have emphasized
the Radicals' legitimate opposition to Johnson's policies and their sincerity in seeking to
circumscribe his powers. There is nothing, however, inconsistent in viewing the Radicals
as both sincerely opposed to Johnson and yet self-serving in the means employed to
remove him.
105. See SMITH, supra note 30, at 446. There was even serious doubt whether the law
by its own terms applied to Stanton. See also TREFOUSSE, supra note 93, at 44-45.
106. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
107. For instance, some historians see the economic issues of hard vs. soft money and
the tariff as driving much of the political side-taking during the impeachment debates. See
BENEDICT, supra note 98, at 65-67.
108. See id at 67-73. Benedict has shown that one motivation behind the impeachment
was a party-internal machination to block the imminent Presidential nomination of U.S.
Grant by the Republican Party. Both Chief Justice Salmon Chase and Senate President
Pro Tempore Benjamin Franklin Wade were leading contenders for the nomination; they
represented the Radicals against the conservatives, who favored Grant. While the results
of the 1867 elections had dimmed Wade's Presidential hopes, some saw the impeachment
as a necessary means to reassert Radical influence prior to the convention (because Wade
would then, even temporarily, assume the power and influence of an incumbent President)
and throw the weight of power and patronage behind Chase. As Chase's biographer put it
in 1874, "The impeachment had... two motives; the first, and most important was, of
course, to get Andrew Johnson out of the presidency; and the second and hardly less
important was to keep General Grant from getting in." J. W. SCHUCKERS, THE LIFE AND
PUBLIC SERVICES OF SALMON PORTLAND CHASE, U.S. SENATOR AND GOVERNOR OF
OHIO 548 (1874).
109. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4, provides for removal of the President, Vice President and
U.S. civil officers upon impeachment for and conviction of Treason, Bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors.
110. See SMITH, supra note 30, at 156; BENEDICT, supra note 98, at 134-35. Chase had
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settled against conviction. Time was working against the Radicals.
They applied "tremendous pressure" on the laggards before the vote
on the first article took place.
Deals and "intense" pressures of various sorts from both sides
were plied to bring the wavering senators into line."' Most historians
view the seven Republicans who voted for acquittal as having placed
their political necks on the chopping block." 2 Despite all the
pressures and arm-twisting, Johnson was ultimately acquitted by a
single vote.
Taken altogether, these extra-legal factors surrounding the 1868
impeachment trial provide a strong rationale for the Radical
leadership to favor less than full public scrutiny of the impeachment
process. While some prior impeachments had also been colored with
strong political motivations, such as the Chase impeachment in 1804,
none had the tinder-box atmosphere of the Johnson trial. The
shocking one-sidedness of the body empowered with the
impeachment procedure was interpreted by contemporaries as a
virtual coup attempt. The blatantly partisan motivations and the lack
of a real legal basis for the charge were all considerations that would
induce the senators running the show to adopt a more circumspect
attitude toward the traditionally open process of impeachment. In
light of the circumstances surrounding the 1868 impeachment,
abandonment of the tradition of openness must have been a foregone
conclusion, since it raised little discussion at the time.
Given the peculiar motivations behind the 1868 changes to the
rules of impeachment, it would be unwise to emulate them as a model
for conducting impeachment proceedings.
H. Senators Are Not Jurors
A. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Ruling
One hundred and thirty years later, the United States Senate
found itself once again embroiled in an impeachment trial. It was
faced with the task of defining the nature of its own function as well
as resolving the momentous matter of whether President Bill
Clinton's actions rose to the level of removable offenses.
During the trial, senators were frequently referred to as
even prepared a special oath of office for Wade on Johnson's removal from office. See
also TREFOUSSE, supra note 93, at 228, n.58.
111. See SMITH, supra note 30, at 446; BENEDICT, supra note 98, at 168-73.
112. Explanations for the defection range from high civic devotion to outright bribery;
the most likely reasons are distaste for the politicization of the impeachment and
unwillingness to place Wade in the White House. See BENEDICr, supra note 98, at 139-40;
MCPHERSON, supra note 102, at 532-33; TREFOUSSE, supra note 93, at 163-69.
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"jurors"" 3 who would deliberate on the articles of impeachment
reported to them by the House of Representatives. Three and one-
half weeks before deliberations began, Senator Tom Harkin (D-
Iowa) lodged a formal objection to the characterization of senators as
"jurors.11 14 The Constitution, he argued, granted power to the
Senate, in lieu of the courts, to try impeachments." 5 Section 2 of
Article III provides that trial of all crimes, except in the cases of
impeachment, shall be by jury; this clause, maintained Senator
Harkin, is "a tremendous exculpatory clause when it comes to
impeachments." He also cited No. 65 of The Federalist, authored by
Alexander Hamilton, which outlined the rationale used by the
framers of the Constitution to grant the Senate sole power to try
impeachments, in particular: "There will be no jury to stand between
the judges who are to pronounce the sentence of the law and the
party who is to receive or suffer it."116 Finally, Senator Harkin
referred to the twenty-six Senate rules governing impeachment, none
of which mention the word "juror.""17
Beyond legal doctrine, Harkin appealed to Chief Justice
Rehnquist with the differences in function between regular jurors and
Senators sitting as triers of an impeachment:
Regular jurors, of course, are chosen, to the maximum extent
possible, with no knowledge of the case. Not so when we try
impeachments. Regular jurors are not supposed to know each
other. Not so here. Regular jurors cannot overrule the judge. Not
so here.118 Regular jurors do not decide what evidence should be
heard, the standards of evidence, nor do they decide what witnesses
shall be called. Not so here." 9 Regular jurors do not decide when
a trial is to be ended. Not so here.120
Senator Harkin concluded his objection by citing the precedential
value of the Clinton impeachment for future generations:
What we do here today does not just decide the fate of one man.
113. See e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S279 (1999) (comments of House Manager Bob Barr);
145 CONG. REC. S39, S59 (1999) (prayer of Chaplain Lloyd Ogilvie); see also Steven
Lubet, Stop Calling Them Jurors, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13, 1999, printed in 145 CONG. REC.
S730 (1999).
114. See 145 CONG. REC. S279 (1999).
115. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
116. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.,
1961).
117. See Rules and Manual of the Senate, S. Res. 479,99th Cong. (1986) (revised).
118. See, e.g., id., rule VII (evidentiary rulings of the Presiding Officer may be
challenged and overruled by the Senate).
119. See, e.g., id., rule VI (the Senate has the power to compel the attendance of
witnesses).
120. See, e.g., ic, rule XIII (the adjournment of the Senate sitting in an impeachment
trial does not operate as an adjournment of Senate legislative and executive business).
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Since the Senate sits on impeachment so rarely, and even more
rarely on the impeachment of a President of the United States,
what we do here sets precedence. Future generations will look
back on this trial not just to find out what happened, but to try to
decide what principles governed our actions. To leave the
impression for future generations that we somehow are jurors and
acting as a jury... I do not believe it would be a valid precedent to
leave future generations that we would be looked upon merely asjurors, but something other than being a juror.12 '
The Chief Justice sustained Harkin's objection, ruling: "The Chair is
of the view that the objection of the Senator from Iowa is well taken;
that the Senate is not simply a jury; it is a court in this case.
Therefore, counsel should refrain from referring to the Senators as
jurors."'u 2
As Rehnquist ruled, senators sitting in an impeachment trial do
not function as traditional jurors; they act as judges. Their role is
actually quasi-judicial. Senators, as officials elected by the people,
serve in a political capacity.
B. The Political Nature of Impeachment
Impeachment is a uniquely political process. Whereas the Vice-
President of the United States presides over the Senate,'2 the framers
of the Constitution empowered the Chief Justice of the United States
to act as Presiding Officer when the President is the subject of an
impeachment trial.124 For were the President to be removed from
office, (s)he would be succeeded by the Vice-President,'1 who thus
has a political conflict of interest.
When Chief Justice Rehnquist sustained Senator Harkin's
objection to the characterization of senators as jurors, he was well
aware of Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 65.126 It is there
Hamilton called impeachments "POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly
to injuries done immediately to the society itself." He understood,
"The prosecution of [impeachments], for this reason, will seldom fail
to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into
parties more or less friendly to the accused." Hamilton warned,
"there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be
121. 145 CONG. REC. S279 (1999).
122. I
123. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
124. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
125. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6, amended by U.S. CONST., amend. XXV, § 1.
126. See REHNQUIST, supra note 89, at 277. The Chief Justice wrote that the papers
known as The Federalist "remain arguably the outstanding single American contribution
to political philosophy." Id. at 30. See also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 234
(1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., citing THE FEDERALIST No. 65, in upholding Senate's right to
appoint trial committees in impeachment proceedings).
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regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the
real demonstrations of innocence or guilt."'127
The impeachment power was included in the Constitution as a
check on the Executive, to protect the separation of powers.128 But
Thomas Jefferson, after presiding over the impeachment trial of
Tennessee Senator William Blount, had grave reservations about the
wisdom of impeachment, due to its inherently political nature. 2 9 In a
1798 letter to James Madison, Jefferson wrote:
I see nothing in the mode of proceeding by impeachment but the
most formidable weapon for the purposes of a dominant faction
that ever was contrived... I know of no solid purpose of
punishment which the courts of law are not equal to, and history
shows, that in England, impeachment has been an engine more of
passion than justice.130
Indeed, the 18th-and 19th--century American impeachments reveal
the driving force to be politically unpopular behavior,
notwithstanding the possible commission of removable offenses.131
Whether or not partisanship actually determined the outcome of the
Chase, Johnson and Clinton impeachments, there is no doubt it drove
the process. 132
Benjamin Franklin, citing the consequence when Charles I had
"rendered himself obnoxious," observed that "recourse was had to
assassination.1' 33 Lord Bryce once described impeachment as "the
heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional arsenal, but because it
is so heavy it is unfit for ordinary use. It is like a hundred-ton gun
which needs complex machinery to bring it into position, an
enormous charge of power to fire it, and a large mark to aim at."'34
Indeed, impeachment is such a powerful device, it has never resulted
in the removal of an American President from office.
127. THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 116, at 396-97 (emphasis in original).
Rehnquist, however, felt that ultimately partisanship did not determine the outcomes in
either the Chase or Johnson impeachments. See REHNQUIST, supra note 89, at 277-78.
128. See THE FEDERALIST No. 66, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter, ed.,
1961).
129. See GEORGE LEE HASKINS, 2 FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL,
1801-15,207 (1981).
130. 8 THE WORKS OF JEFFERSON 369-70 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1904-05).
131. See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT 95-97 (1973).
132. See Parts I and H of this article.
133. Franklin therefore advocated a provision in the Constitution "for the regular
punishment of the Executive when his misconduct should deserve it, and for his honorable
acquittal when he should be unjustly accused." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION 65 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
134. 1 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 283 (1888).
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C. The Differing Functions of Jurors and Senators
Senator Harkin listed several factors that distinguish senators
from jurors, including their quantum of knowledge about the case,
their ability to overrule the judge/presiding officer on evidentiary and
testimonial matters and their power to adjourn the trial.135 There are
many other differences between the roles played by jurors in judicial
proceedings and senators in an impeachment trial. Senators, unlike
jurors, have access to the evidence before the trial begins and may
comment on it as the trial proceeds. They judge the law as well as the
facts. And whereas jurors are forbidden from discussing the evidence
until the case is submitted to them for deliberation, senators can, and
frequently are, lobbied by their constituents about the issues during
trial; indeed, many hold press conferences where they discuss the
evidence.1 36 Senators, who are elected by the people, are accountable
to the people.
D. Jurors Deliberate in Secret; Senators Should Not
Notwithstanding Chief Justice Rehnquist's ruling that senators
sitting in an impeachment trial are not jurors, several Republican
senators persisted in characterizing themselves as jurors.137 This
135. See supra Part II.A of this article.
136. See infra Part II.E of this article.
137. See Eric Pianin & Guy Gugliotta, Public Deliberations Unlikely in Senate, WASH.
POST, Feb. 9, 1999, at Al (Mississippi Senator Trent Lott's spokesman, paraphrasing Lott,
said, "The Senate is now approaching a mode where it's most like a jury, and at no time in
the history of trial-by-jury have those deliberations been public."); Frank Bruni,
Opposition by Lott Appears to Bar Opening of Deliberation to Public, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
1999, at Al (spokesman said Lott opposes open deliberations in deference to Senate
tradition and the longer tradition of juries deliberating in private; he said Lott "feels that
the Senate must act like any jury."); Marc Lacey & Richard A. Serrano, President's Fate Is
Now in Hands of Senate Jurors, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1999, at Al (Lott spokesman said
senator opposed opening debate "because the Senate is at this moment as close to a jury
as it gets. No jury in the Western world is open. Now is not the time to change that
precedent."). See also Anne E. Kornblut, Senate Prepares to Shut its Doors for
Deliberations, Bos. GLOBE, Feb. 9, 1999, at A13 (quoting Senator Phil Gramm of Texas,
"We have public witnesses and closed jury deliberations every day in every town in
America."); Helen Dewar & Peter Baker, Clinton Fate Is Debated in Private, WASH.
POST, Feb. 10, 1999, at Al (Idaho Senator Larry E. Craig said, "I think the deliberations
should be in closed session, as all juries in this country are. I think they would not be
deliberations otherwise, and they should not be called deliberations. They should be
called final statements or final speeches or political statements."); James W. Brosnan,
Mid-South Senators Explain Stance on Secrecy, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 10,
1999, at A12 (Tennessee Senator Bill Frist explained, "Every jury in America deliberates
in closed session. That tradition is fundamental to our legal system and I'm not convinced
there is anything to be gained by the glare of television lights on that process."); METRO
OPINION, Closed doors: This jury should deliberate in the open, ANCHORAGE DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 10, 1999, at B4 (spokesman for Alaska Senator Frank Murkowski explained
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characterization provided them a rationale for arguments that
deliberations should be off limits to the public.138
The secrecy of modern-day jury deliberations is well-settled in
most jurisdictions.139 In judicial proceedings, the deliberations have
been closed to the public, and indeed to television cameras, except in
tightly controlled experiments by CBS and PBS.140 The workings of
the early jury were described by William S. Holdsworth as "divine."
He wrote, "when the jury was first introduced the method by which it
arrived at its verdict inherited the inscrutability of the judgments of
God." 141 Benjamin Cardozo worried in 1933, "Freedom of debate
might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors were
made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely
published to the world."'142
Senators sitting in an impeachment trial, however, are not jurors
in the traditional sense, Rehnquist ruled on January 15, 1999.143 The
following week, Tom Harkin advocated opening the deliberations to
the public. Harkin, reflecting on Rehnquist's ruling, elaborated on
the floor of the Senate why he had previously raised the distinction
between jurors and senators. In addition to finding the facts and the
law, he explained, senators must also consider how the case came to
the Senate, the issues involved, the importance of the case and each
senator's vote to close deliberations primarily because Senate is a jury in this case and
juries in U.S. deliberate in private, and secondarily because of Senate tradition). The day
before the vote to close debate on the motion to dismiss, Utah Senator Orrin Hatch
explained his rationale for supporting closure, "to keep it like a jury." See also John
Hassell, Democrats push for public debate: Senate likely to keep session closed," NEWARK
STAR-LEDGER, Jan. 24, 1999, at 15. But see Sen. Jon Kyl, A Senator's Trial Diary: Senate
Considers Aide's Veracity, ARIZ. REP., Feb. 10, 1999, at A14 ("But these deliberations are
not like what a jury does. We don't sit around a table and discuss the case. Each of us is
entitled to speak once, for no more than 15 minutes.").
Senators Lott, Gramm, Craig, Frist and Murkowski all opposed opening the
deliberations to the public. Seantor Kyl was one of the few Republicans who favored
open deliberations. See 145 CONG. REc. S 1386 (1999).
Senator Chris Dodd (D-Conn.), in accordance with his vote to open deliberations,
said, "We're not a jury. We're not sequestered.... I can think of no justification other
than that we do not want them [Americans] to hear what we have to say." Stephen Koff &
Keith Epstein, Both sides make last appeals in Clinton trial: Senate to begin deliberations
today, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Feb. 9, 1999, at 1A.
138. The vote to close the deliberations broke down largely along party lines. Forty-
five Democrats and fourteen Republicans voted to open them. Forty-one Republicans
and no Democrats voted to close the deliberations. 145 CONG. REc. S1386-88 (1999).
139. See Abraham Abramovsky & Jonathan I. Edelstein, Cameras in the Jury Room:
An Unnecessary and Dangerous Precedent, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 865, 885 (1996).
140. See MARJORIE COHN & DAVID Dow, CAMERAS IN THE COURTROOM:
TELEVISION AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 154-56 (1998).
141. WILLIAM L. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 317 (1956).
142. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
143. See supra, Part II.A.
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piece of evidence in relation to the rest, the public will and the effect
of the result on the public good.144 Harkin then said if senators were
jurors, they would deliberate in secret; but since they are not jurors,
they are not bound by the secrecy requirement.145
Unlike jurors, senators are elected by the people to whom they
must answer. The Founding Fathers recognized impeachment is
inherently political1 46 They accordingly lodged the power to try
impeachments in the Senate instead of the courts. 47 Impeachment
was conceived as a process to remove a President whose behavior was
so egregious it rendered him or her unfit to serve."48
The removal of an elected President from office warrants public
scrutiny. In a democracy, the people are sovereign. The election of a
President places the power to govern in a person chosen by the
governed. When Congress takes the drastic step of impeachment, the
people, to whom both Congress and the President are beholden, must
be permitted to witness the entire process. A decision to remove a
President should be made in public. It is mandatory the people
understand why the Senate might undo the results of a democratic
election of their President.
E. Precedent Set by Senators in the Clinton Case
Debates and deliberations on the articles of impeachment against
Bill Clinton occurred behind closed doors. Votes to close them broke
down largely along party lines, with most Democrats favoring
openness and most Republicans opting for secrecy.149  Politics
motivated the chasm. Many Democrats, confident of acquittal,
wished to have a public forum to voice their disapproval of Clinton's
behavior while maintaining it did not rise to the level of a removable
offense.150 They also sought to focus the public on the misconduct of
Kenneth Starr and the GOP House Managers. 15' Senator John F.
Kerry (D-Mass.) thought the charges, "at least as to perjury, are
extraordinarily faulty, and I think Starr is asignificant factor in... the
144. See 145 CONG. REc. S279-30 (1999).
145. See id.
146. See supra, Part II.B.
147. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, supra note 116, at 396-401.
148. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (requiring "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes or
Misdemeanors").
149. See supra notes 137 and 138.
150. See Bruni, supra note 137.
151. See Ken Foskett, Senate keeps vow of silence-Impeachment trial heads for
'moment of truth' as senators debate Clinton charges behind closed doors, ATLANTA
CONST., Feb. 10, 1999, at Al (Starr brought the charges and the Managers prosecuted the
case.).
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propriety of this case and the place we find ourselves in." 152 Kerry
understood that impeachment is by its very nature a political
proceeding and senators do more than traditional jurors. "We don't
just decide this case on the facts." "We also decide how this case fits
into the larger mosaic of whether the president should be removed."
In Kerry's judgment, "a very, very real component of that is the
question of entrapment and prosecutorial abuse.' 1 53
Most Republicans, in an effort to stave off the Democratic plan
to attack Starr and the House Managers, opted for closure.5 4 "Some
thought the Democrats would raise hell," said Senator Chuck Bagel
(R-Neb.), who felt his Republican colleagues had erred in opposing
open deliberations. "Everyone knows this is a political trial," Hagel
observed. 55 Mississippi Republican Senator Thad Cochran opposed
open deliberations, thinking they were "just going to be used so
Democrats can have some air time to trash the Republicans." Orrin
G. Hatch (R-Utah) said senators could "talk turkey" in executive
session. He wanted "to depoliticize it as much as possible."15 6
Likewise, Iowa Republican Senator Charles E. Grassley thought,
"For some people, this is seen as a political game and not a judicial
proceeding.' '157 Indeed, Republicans were caught in their own
political dilemma. They would have to explain to the public why they
voted to remove a popular President, or justify to their conservative
supporters why they did not. "Their best move," according to
Senator Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.), was "to go do it in the dark of
night."'58
The primary Democratic argument in support of open
deliberations focused on "the public's right to know."15 9  Iowa
Senator Tom Harkin, after losing the bid for open deliberations, said,
"The floor of the Senate, no matter how clubby, is not a private
club... I believe the public has every right to see and hear how we
reached the decisions we reach."' 6° He also told the press, "It's a
152. Pianin & Gugliotta, supra note 137.
153. Foskett, supra note 151.
154. Bruni, supra note 137.
155. See Jake Thompson, Senators Deliberate in Private; Vote on Closing Deliberations,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Feb. 10, 1999, at 1.
156. Pianin & Gugliotta, supra note 137.
157. Id
158. Idt; see also John Hassell, Democrats move to open secret talks, STAR-LEDGER
(Newark, NJ.), Jan. 24, 1999, at 16 (quoting Sen. Frank Lautenberg (D-N.J.): "It looks to
me like the Republicans want to shut down the public's ability to hear what's going on ....
They realize they are on the wrong side of an issue that the public is looking at very
intently.").
159. See Pianin & Gugliotta, supra note 137 (comments of Sen. John D. "Jay"
Rockefeller).
160. Thompson, supra note 155.
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shame the public's not invited. The microphones in the chamber
were paid for by the American people, to paraphrase Ronald
Reagan. 1 61 Moreover, Michigan Democratic Senator Carl Levin said
at a news conference, "The gravest responsibility next to declaring
war that the Senate has is the question of whether or not to remove a
president of the United States from office .... And there is no
way.., that deliberation can be held behind closed doors."' 62
Democratic senators, such as Joseph I. Lieberman of
Connecticut, felt open deliberations would help begin a national
healing process from "this terrible, unseemly episode in our nation's
history." 163 Senators Tom Harkin and Paul Wellstone (D-Minn.)
concurred. In a Los Angeles Times editorial piece, they raised "the
potential of an open Senate debate to help begin the healing process."
They wrote, "This episode has deeply wounded our national fabric. It
has polarized the American people and culture."' 64 Lieberman
thought the American people should see it "end on a note of rational
and thoughtful debate.' 65
Speaking on the floor of the Senate in support of open
deliberations, Wisconsin Democratic Senator Russ Feingold said,
"the Constitution trusts the people to elect a President, but our
current Senate impeachment rules do not trust them to have even the
most passive involvement in our deliberative process, even when the
debate might result in overturning the people's judgment in a national
election."'6 Feingold felt closed-door deliberations "may not be
sufficient to ensure public confidence in the fairness of the
proceedings."' 67 Lieberman also stressed public accountability; in a
statement released before the vote on closing deliberations, he wrote:
"If we close our deliberations at this extraordinary moment in our
nation's history, the public will be forever deprived of a full
accounting of these proceedings, and some may question our
willingness to be held accountable for our actions."'
1 68
161. Tom Raum & Pete Leffler, Party Lines Decided Door-Closing Vote, ALLENTOWN
MORNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Jan. 26,1999, at Al.
162. ASSOCIATED PRESS, A Handful of Democratic Senators, Feb. 5,1999.
163. Edwin Chen, Open Senate Deliberations Urged Congress: Large Bipartisan Group
of Senators Calls for Public Viewing of Proceedings Before the Votes on Articles of
Impeachment, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 6,1999, at All.
164. Tom Harkin & Paul Wellstone, Open the Doors of the Senate-This debate needs
to be done in the open to help restore the public's faith in its elected institutions, L.A. TIMEs,
Feb. 9,1999, at B7.
165. Chen, supra note 163.
166. 145 CONG. REC. S720 (1999).
167. Joel Dresang, Feingold Says Senate Deliberations Should Be Open to Public,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 1999, at 5.
168. Joe Lieberman, Lieberman Calls for Open Impeachment Deliberations, GOV'T.
PRESS RELEASES, F.D.C.H., Feb. 5,1999.
OPEN-AND-SHUTJanuary 2000]
Some Republicans agreed the deliberations should have been
public. Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter thought, "It is very
important for the American people to understand as fully as possible
why we are doing what we are doing.' 69 Likewise, Maine Senator
Susan Collins urged: "this very momentous matter... should be
debated in the light of day so that the American people and future
generations fully understand the reasons for our votes.' 70 Not all
Democrats walked in lockstep either. For example, when Senator
Robert F. Byrd (D-W.Va.) made a motion to dismiss the charges
against President Clinton, he was concerned that public debate could
lead to more partisanship.' 7'
Republican Senators Conrad Burns (R-Mont.), 172 Chuck Hagel
(R-Neb.) 7 3 and Frank Murkowski (Alaska) 174 worried that senators
would play to the television cameras and that would affect the debate.
John McCain (R-Ariz.) called it "partisan posturing."' 75 Republicans
such as Mitch McConnell of Kentucky thought senators "are more
reasonable" in a private setting.176 Robert Bennett (R-Utah) felt "a
whole lot more comfortable" without the TV coverage. 77
But nearly all of the senators felt comfortable enough on
television to speak loquaciously to the press at recesses during the
secret deliberations. Many were falling over each other to be first to
speak into the cameras. "Drifting through the official silence of the
impeachment trial, individual senators today began exhibiting traits
of adaptability worthy of Galapagos tortoises maneuvering for scraps
of sunshine," penned Francis X. Clines of The New York Times.178
Ben Nighthorse Campbell, a Republican senator from Colorado,
sat in the back row of the Senate Chamber near the exit doors. At
169. ASSOCIATED PRESS, Lewinsky: He Never Told Me To Lie, Feb. 5,1999.
170. Chen, supra note 163.
171. See 145 CONG. REC. S974 (1999); Stephen Green, Senators Clash Over Need for
Secrecy-Full, Public View Could Stop at Final Deliberations, PEORIA J. STAR (Peoria,
Ill.), Jan. 24,1999, at A2.
172. See Green, supra note 171.
173. Eric Schmitt, Support Grows to Deliberate in Public View, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4,
1999, at Al.
174. See statement of senator's spokesman, Chuck Kleeschulte, Opinion, Closed
doors-This jury should deliberate in the open, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Feb. 10, 1999,
at B4.
175. Jeff Barker, Closed Session Explosive, ARIz. REPUB., Jan. 26, 1999, at Al.
176. Mark Sherman, The President on Trial-Public or Private? Secrecy rule could close
Senate trial soon, ATLANTA CONST., Jan. 21,1999, at A18.
177. Ann Scott Tyson, What Shapes a Senator's Vote-As Members Begin Deliberating,
They Weigh Not Only Guilt or Innocence, but Also Principle and Practicality, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 9, 1999, at 1.
178. Francis X. Clines, Television Lights Lure President's Triers From Behind Closed
Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1999, at A22.
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each recess, he saw his colleagues sprint to the waiting cameras. He
quipped, "As you know, I used to be on the U.S. Olympic Team, and
I tell my speedy friends-you could have made the team.' 79 Senator
Arlen Specter (R-Pa.), at a news conference after the Senate voted
not to open deliberations to the public, observed, "This is the oddest
procedure around where it's on television in the corridors and it can't
be on television in the main chamber."
When the motion to open deliberations was defeated, the
senators struck a compromise, agreeing to allow those who wished to
place all or parts of their own statements in the Congressional Record
to do so.18° Rule XXIX, section 5, of the Standing Rules of the
Senate contains the penalty of expulsion for senators who disclose
what took place in secret proceedings.' 8' This rule was suspended by
the decision of the senators to allow the release of their own
statements. William Jefferson Clinton was acquitted on February 12,
1999, of both articles of impeachment after closed-door
deliberations.182 By the next day, seventy-five senators had taken
advantage of the opportunity to put their statements in the Record. 83
Kay Bailey Hutchison, who had questioned Rehnquist about rule
XX's presumption for openness before the secret deliberations,184
described the insertion of senators' statements into the Congressional
Record as "a sterile approach to history and hardly the deliberation
that befits the world's greatest deliberative body."' 85  Likewise,
Minnesota Democrat Paul Wellstone, one of the passionate advocates
for openness, thought the compromise "a very poor substitute" for
open deliberations, calling it "a great leap sideways.'
86
Although many Republican senators predicted the deliberations
would go much faster behind closed doors,'87 that did not happen.'
88
179. Sex, Lies and Videotape: The Clinton Trial Transcripts, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESS,
Feb. 14, 1999.
180. See 145 CONG. REC. S1386-87 (daily ed. February 9, 1999).
181. See supra, Part I.B.4.
182. Neither article garnered the two-thirds majority necessary to convict. The perjury
article received 45 votes for conviction and 55 votes for acquittal. See 145 CONG. REC.
S1458 (daily ed. February 12, 1999). The vote on the obstruction of justice article was split
50-50. See id. at S1459.
183. See Sex, Lies and Videotape, supra note 179.
184. See CONG. REC., supra note 180, S1387.
185. Kay Bailey Hutchison, The Right to See History Happening, WASH. POST, Feb. 8,
1999, at A19.
186. Jim Abrams, Senators Fail in Bid to Open Debate, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 9,
1999.
187. See J. Scott Orr, Senators Debate Censure Question, STAR-LEDGER (Newark,
N.J.), Feb. 8,1999, at 001 (quoting Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.)).
188. See David Rogers, Senate Closes Doors and Begins Final Deliberations on Clinton,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 1999, at A4.
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And those who hoped that real deliberation could take place in
private 89 were also mistaken.19° Each senator used his or her fifteen
minutes to make a speech and there was very little give and take,
according to several reports.'9' But many senators congratulated
themselves for the high level of discourse in the secret
deliberations. 92 This sentiment was underscored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist at the end of the trial: "I have been impressed by the
quality of the debate in closed session on the entire question of
impeachment as provided for under the Constitution."' 93 Harkin and
Wellstone agreed, in their Los Angeles Times editorial: "The
deliberations have been substantive, honest and well-argued. They
would have shown the Senate to be, in fact, the greatest deliberative
body in the world and would have reaffirmed the principles of our
representative democracy.' ' 9 4
Unfortunately, the American people-only nineteen percent of
whom felt the senators had worked in a fair and nonpartisan
manner 95-were not there to witness this momentous debate. An
editorial in the New York Daily News insisted that although the
public had endured a trial most did not want, taxpayers and voters
were entitled to see how the final outcome was reached. "It matters
189. See id. (quoting Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.); James W. Bronson, Mid-South
Senators Explain Stance on Secrecy, COMM. APP. (Memphis, Tenn.), Feb. 10, 1999, at A12
(quoting Senator Fred Thompson (R-Tenn.)).
190. See Rogers, supra note 188; Jake Thompson, Senators Deliberate in Private; Vote
on Closing Deliberations, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Feb. 10, 1999, at 1 (quoting
statement of Senator Bob Kerrey (D-Neb.)).
191. See Thompson, supra note 190; Ken Foskett, Senate Keeps Vow of Silence-
Impeachment Trial Heads for 'Moment of Truth' as Senators Debate Clinton Charges
Behind Closed Doors, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 10, 1999, at Al.
192. See statements of Senator Trent Lott (R-Miss.), who called his colleagues'
speeches during secret deliberations "magnificent," Put it Behind Us? It Can't Be Done-
The Record Written in the Case Against Clinton Will Have Effects Far Beyond This
Generation, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH), Feb. 14, 1999, at 2D; Orrin Hatch (R-
Utah), "There was no demagoguery. It was serious stuff. I was proud of the United
States... Senate," Foskett, supra note 191; Senator Craig Thomas (R-Wyo.), Gabriel
Escobar, Looking for Big Meaning in Big Votes; Exhausted Senators Reflect on Personal
Decisions, Impact of Process on Institution, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1999, at A31; Senator
Carl Levin (D-Mich.), Helen Dewar & Peter Baker, Doors Close, But Not on Acquittal-
Impeachment Trial Debate Begins with Little Doubt of the Outcome, FRESNO BEE, Feb.
10, 1999, at Al.
193. 145 CONG. REC. S1459 (daily ed. February 12,1999).
194. Harkin & Wellstone, supra note 164. Their sentiment was echoed by Senator
Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), who noted sadly, "I think we lost out. If the American people could
have seen each of us stand and explain ourselves... I think the Senate as an institution
would have grown in stature." Ellyn Ferguson, Bayv I Voted My Conscience, GANNETr
NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 13,1999.
195. See New York Times/CBS News Pol Jan. 30 to Feb. 1, 1999, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
1999, at Al.
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not that acquittal is pre-ordained," observed the editorial. "The
explanation for all votes matters now, and to history.' 96 Indeed, the
senators in the Clinton trial frequently referred back to the 1868
Johnson impeachment trial for guidance. When senators cite Clinton
as precedence for future impeachments, that precedent should be
worthy of citation.
1I. Open the Door to the Twenty-First Century
Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman.
- Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis' 97
Unlike the acquittal of Andrew Johnson, the exoneration of Bill
Clinton vindicated the popular will. Clinton-twice elected to be
President-enjoyed immense popularity with voters who had spoken
through the polls. By contrast, many Americans were critical of
Johnson-heir to the presidency upon Lincoln's death-believing he
catered to the defeated Confederacy. "Much of the country was for
[Johnson's] impeachment because [the] people thought [he] was
playing footsie with the Southerners," according to Johnson scholar
and historian Hans L. Trefousse198 Johnson escaped conviction by
only one vote. Ironically, however, in a throwback to the 19th
century, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) blamed Clinton's
impeachment and trial on the "radical Republicans."' 99
Kennedy's characterization describes the anti-Johnson forces as
well, but in name only. There exist myriad differences between
America of 1868 and the United States on the eve of the 21st century.
Notably, senators were chosen by the state legislatures until 1913.
Now they are popularly elected. Today Americans expect and
demand greater accountability from their government, particularly in
the wake of Watergate. And the power of television with the advent
of instant mass communication was unimaginable to the senators who
sat in judgment of Andrew Johnson.
A. Popularly Elected Senators
Article I, section 3 of the Constitution originally placed the
power to elect U.S. senators in the hands of the respective state
196. The Public Be Damned, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 10,1999, at 34.
197. Louis BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 92 (Augustus M. Kelley 1971)
(1914).
198. Art Pine, 19th Century Impeachment Viewed as Lesson for Clinton Case, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 1998, at A5.
199. William Neikirk & Mike Doming, Clinton Acquitted-Articles Fail Even to Muster
Majority, Feb. 13, 1999, at 1.
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legislatures. 200 The end of the 19th century gave birth to a movement
for popular election of senators; between 1893 and 1902, five
constitutional amendments cleared the House but stalled in the
Senate. In 1901, Oregon implemented non-binding popular elections
for its senators. Although the winner of the first election under this
law in 1902 was not selected by the legislature, the idea gained
popularity.
Within a few years several other states had passed similar laws.
By 1911, worried that proponents would call a constitutional
convention that would open the door to other progressive measures,
Congress passed the 17th Amendment,201 which was ratified in 1913.
The first popularly elected senator was from Maryland and the first
general election under the new procedure was held in 1914. All 23
incumbents who had been elected by the legislature and ran for re-
election were returned by the voters.202 The senators were now
directly accountable to the people.
B. Increased Accountability Of Government
Greater scrutiny of our government officials was the primary by-
product of the Watergate crisis. "[T]he nation sat mesmerized
through hour after televised hour of the Senate Watergate hearings.
Each episode provided a new excursion into the dark secrets of the
Nixon White House, evoking a crescendo of cries for 'new openness'
in government. ' '203 The Ethics in Government Act was enacted,
requiring the appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate and
prosecute suspected misdeeds by high government officials.2 04
Whereas the sexual proclivities of American Presidents, such as John
F. Kennedy, were largely ignored by the press before Watergate, they
are now subjected to microscopic analysis before millions of people.205
The routine televising of Senate proceedings is a direct outgrowth of
the Watergate affair and the Nixon case.206
Heightened accountability of government is also reflected in the
evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence. It has been well-
200. See supra note 30.
201. "The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each
State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote."
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, § 1.
202. See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GUIDE To U.S. ELECTIONS 780 (1994).
203. COHN & Dow, supra note 140, at 22.
204. See Marjorie Cohn, The Politics of the Clinton Impeachment and the Death of the
Independent Counsel Statute: Toward Depoliticization, 102 W. VA. L. REV. __ (2000)
(forthcoming).
205. See, e.g, BOB WOODWARD, SHADOw-FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF
WATERGATE 21 (1999).
206. See infra Part IILD.
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established since The Federalist was written that the people are
sovereign in the American system of government.2 7 In order to be
accountable to the governed, the work of the government must be
known to the people. There should be full public access to
information about the institutions of government for the people to
govern themselves. James Madison wrote in 1822, "A popular
Government without popular information, or the means of acquiring
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean
to be their own governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives. '' 208 The First Amendment guarantees the right to
receive information.2°9 No law epitomizes this right more than the
Freedom of Information Act which provides public access to
government information held by federal agencies.
210
To be educated about, and in turn, judge their institutions of
government, the people must witness official proceedings. "Public
inclusion... hopefully promotes confidence in the fair administration
of justice."21' The Supreme Court realized, "People in an open
society do not demand infallibility from their institutions," but, wrote
Chief Justice Warren Burger, "it is difficult for them to accept what
they are prohibited from observing. '212 He warned of the dangers
inherent in an unpopular decision reached in secret: "The crucial
prophylactic aspects of the administration of justice cannot function
in the dark .... A result considered untoward may undermine public
confidence, and where the trial has been concealed from public view
an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best
has failed and at worst has been corrupted 213
No act of government requires greater accountability than the
congressional removal of a President. Under our Constitution,
207. See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Federalist No. 78, in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS
468 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("[T]he power of the people is superior to both [the
judiciary and the legislature]," "[t]he people, not the government, possess the absolute
sovereignty." See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,274 (1964) (quoting
James Madison, Report of the General Assembly of Virginia, in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES ON
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 569-70 (1876)).
208. Letter to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 103 (G.
Hunt ed. 1910), quoted in Polillo v. Deane, 379 A2d 211,215 (N.J. 1977).
209. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587, n.3 (1980)
(Brennan, J. concurring) (quoting Justice Powell's dissent in Saxbe v. Washington Post
Co., 417 U.S. 843, 862-63 (1974)). Saxbe was decided the same year Nixon resigned as a
result of the Watergate crisis.
210. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994).
211. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (quoting State v. Schmit, 139 N.W.2d 800,
807 (Minn. 1966)).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 571.
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conviction and removal may overturn the results of a national
election, effectively nullifying the votes of millions of Americans.
"Public confidence is the key ingredient upon which the impeachment
process properly depends. '21 4 When a President is removed by the
legislature, the legitimacy of the new administration hinges on public
acceptance that removal was justified.215
The decision to acquit President Clinton, albeit consistent with
the popular will according to the polls, should have taken place in the
light of day, before the American people. Both those who supported
conviction and those who opposed it had the right to see how the
decision had been reached.
C. The Right to a Public Trial
First Amendment jurisprudence, which has evolved into a broad
right of public access to judicial proceedings, is a creature of the 20th
century. It is well-settled that the public has a constitutional right to
attend trials.216 The right to a public trial, although placed in the
Sixth Amendment for the benefit of a defendant in a criminal
proceeding,217 also inures to the public and the press through the First
Amendment. 2 18 The "public trial" of the 1800's was held in a huge
gallery where the masses could attend. But many today feel a public
trial means a televised trial.2 19
The First Amendment right to a public trial gives way to a
compelling state interest, such as a showing that a televised trial will
prejudice the fair trial rights of a defendant in a criminal case.2 20 An
impeachment trial, however, is not a criminal proceeding. The
public's right to access in an impeachment trial need not, therefore,
be limited by the same constraints. Although a President stands to
lose his or her right to hold office as the result of a conviction in an
impeachment trial, the Senate cannot deprive the defendant of liberty
or life.22' When an impeached President is on trial, the American
people have the right to see the entire proceeding.
214. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The People and the Founding Fathers, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB., Feb. 17,1999, at B-9.
215. See Edwin Brown Firmage & R. Colin Mangrum, Removal of the President:
Resignation and the Procedural Law of Impeachment, 1974 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1043-44
(1974).
216. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572; Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior
Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509
(1984); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986).
217. See COHN & Dow, supra note 140, at 29-30,40.
218. See id. at 40.
219. See infra Part III.D.
220. See Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560,574 (1981).
221. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
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Secret deliberations beget public television appearances by
senators at press conferences, scrambling to explain their positions.
Even though some may choose to put their statements into the
Congressional Record,222 there is no requirement that all senators
enter their entire remarks. Such self-selection thus presents a skewed
picture of the deliberations. And, as stated in an editorial in The San
Francisco Chronicle, advocating open deliberations: "In an age of
ubiquitous television, Americans have become habituated to live
coverage of important events and are properly skeptical of leaks and
second-hand reports by participants with their own agendas." 223
C-SPAN, CNN and Common Cause urged the Senate to allow
gavel-to-gavel television coverage of the deliberations in President
Clinton's impeachment trial.224 In full-page newspapers ads in The
Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times and USA Today, CNN
urged:
The United States Senate has decided to debate one of the
most important issues of our time in secret.
Except for a declaration of war, no proceeding of the Senate
has such historic implications as those which could lead to the
removal from office of an American president.
Conducting these debates behind closed doors denies people
throughout the world the opportunity to judge the fairness of the
proceedings and excludes firsthand information from being made
available to the millions of American voters who have a vital stake
in the trial's outcome.
We urge the Senate to open the debates in light of the
importance of what is at stake and the First Amendment values of
open government that are so central to our democracy.22-
The letter from Common Cause President Ann McBride stressed,
"The work of the Senate must be conducted in public for its decisions
to command the respect of the public." She wrote, "If the Senate
deliberates in secret, there will forever be lingering questions about
what happened and why."'226 The First Amendment right of access to
the judicial process should include the right of the American people
to see their senators deliberate the fate of their President.
222. See supra Part MI.E.
223. Impeachment Debate Should be Public, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 8,1999, at A20.
224. See Cox News Service, C-SPAN Asks Senate to Allow Televising of Trial, Dec. 24,
1998; Associated Press Political Service, Letter of Ann McBride, President, Common
Cause, Jan. 20, 1999; David Bauder, CNN Appeals to Senators, AssOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
30,1999.
225. Bauder, supra note 224.
226. Letter of Ann McBride, supra note 224.
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D. Public Deliberations Mean Televised Deliberations
The most dramatic development affecting public accountability
in the last 130 years is the advent of television. Just as Richard Nixon
in 1974, used TV to tell Americans he was no "crook," so Bill Clinton
told millions of viewers, "I did not have sexual relations with that
woman-Ms. Lewinsky," in 1998.
Television cameras were first installed in the Senate chamber in
1974, in anticipation of the impeachment trial'of Richard Nixon. It
was not until 1986, however, that they were used regularly for Senate
sessions. C-SPAN 2 has provided live gavel-to-gavel coverage of
every public Senate session since June 2, 1986.227
When the House Judiciary Committee conducted impeachment
hearings in the Nixon case, 70 million Americans watched the
proceedings on television.m This was the first telecast of its kind in
U.S. history.229 Congressman Sidney Yates (D-Ill.), in January 1974,
introduced the first resolution to provide for television and radio
coverage of the impeachment proceedings in the House chamber,
saying "Certainly, our actions on the floor in this extraordinary
proceeding should be open to the public's scrutiny, for when we have
finished our vote, the people must know the decision has not been
political or vindictive, but has been based upon solid fact and in
accordance with law." 30
Many other like resolutions were introduced in the House over
the next seven months.2 1 More informal efforts to televise Nixon's
trial occurred in the Senate during this period.232 When H. Res. 1107,
which would open House Judiciary Committee deliberations to
television, was debated in July 1974, most congresspersons supported
it. Opponents voiced concern for Nixon's due process rights. Some
fears were assuaged by assurances from the networks that advances in
technology obviated the necessity for the large, bulky, noisy cameras
used in the Billie Sol Estes trial. 233 Another concern voiced in
227. See Cox News Service, supra note 224.
228. See Ronald Garay, Televising Presidential Impeachment: The US Congress Sets the
Stage, 19 HIST. J. FILM, RADIO & TV 57 (1999).
229. See id.
230. It. at 58-59.
231. See id. at 60-62.
232. See id. at 62.
233. The Supreme Court had held in Estes v. Texas, that televising parts of Estes's
swindling trial had denied him due process. 381 U.S. 532, 550-52 (1965). Chandler v.
Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981), had not yet been decided in 1974. Seven years after Congress
debated broadcasting Nixon's impeachment proceeding, the Supreme Court said in
Chandler that televising a criminal trial was not a per se due process violation. See
Chandler, 449 U.S. at 582. If a defendant could show the TV camera would deprive him or
her of the right to a fair trial, it should not be allowed. See id,
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opposition to televising the Judiciary Committee deliberations was
that it would provide a skewed picture, since the public would not be
privy to the months of closed-door meetings preceding the televised
hearings. Nevertheless, the resolution prevailed overwhelmingly in
the full House.234
There was also a difference of opinion when the Senate Rules
and Administration Committee considered whether to allow Nixon's
expected Senate trial to be televised. Senator Robert Taft Jr. (R-OH)
opposed it, citing Estes v. Texas,235 and arguing that television would
provide an "unparalleled opportunity to create a favorable
impression on our constituents." He maintained, "It places us
[senators] in the role of presenting our own case to a jury consisting
of the TV audience in support of our eventual or predetermined
individual judgment as to how each of us votes." He was concerned
that "TV coverage can only impede or unduly delay the proceedings
to the prejudice of the President and the American people. ''236 One
of the leading proponents of televising the Senate trial, Senator Philip
Hart (D-Mich.), argued, "America is concerned and divided about
Watergate and seeks the best resolution of its impact on the
Presidency. Whatever the outcome," he said, "it should be perceived
as a result of fair procedures. ''237
The Senate Rules and Administration Committee approved
Senator Robert C. Byrd's238 Senate Resolution 371, providing for
televised coverage of Nixon's Senate impeachment trial, with the
details to be worked out by the committee in consultation with the
Senate floor leadership.239 Nixon's resignation, however, precluded
the trial and concomitant television coverage.
Although the matter of whether the camera-and thus the
public-could enter the Senate chamber during the Clinton
deliberations did become a hotly contested issue, there was never a
dispute about whether the rest of the proceedings would be televised.
When the House voted to impeach Clinton, broadcast network
234. See Garay, supra note 228, at 60-61. The House Judiciary Committee then voted
31 to 7, to allow gavel-to-gavel coverage of their concluding arguments and votes on the
articles of impeachment. See William Chapman & Bradley Graham, Judiciary Debate to
Go on TV, WASH. PosT, Jul. 23,1974, at Al.
235. See Garay, supra note 228, at 62-63.
236. Id. at 63.
237. Id. at 128.
238. Senator Byrd (D-Va.) made the motion to dismiss the articles of impeachment
against Bill Clinton 24 years later, but voted to close debate on the motion. See 145
CONG. REc. S963, S974 (daily ed. January 25,1999).
239. See U.S. Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Amending the Rules of
Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on Impeachment Trials, S. REP. No. 93-
1125, at 22-27 (1974).
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viewing was higher than normal and cable channels CNN, MSNBC
and Fox News Channel achieved record or near-record ratings.240 But
the broadcast networks-who stood to lose money by preempting
their soap operas and game shows-televised only the most dramatic
portions of the proceedings.241  When polled on whether the
deliberations should be open to the public, respondents were divided
49 percent to 49 percent.242
Charles L. Black, Jr., in his primer on impeachment, advocates
open impeachment trials. "Trial on an impeachment," he writes, "is
public business." 243 But he adamantly opposes televising it. While
asserting that television acts upon what it purports to observe, he
shuns the effect of public pressure on senators, which, he maintains,
increases when the proceeding is televised. "Public opinion polls on
guilt or innocence," he argues, "should be looked on as an
unspeakable indecency." 244
Some of the senators echoed Black's sentiments during the
Clinton impeachment.2 45 That senators may feel public pressure is an
oxymoron. Senators are elected by the people and are therefore
necessarily accountable to them. By their very raison d'etre, senators
play to their public, whether directly or through reporting by the
media. The people recognize grandstanding when they see it.
Walter E. Dellinger, reviewing Black's book and also writing for
Yale, argues the absence of complete live television coverage may
itself affect the outcome of the trial.246 "Is it not possible," Dellinger
asks, "that a member of the Senate, personally convinced by a careful
and detailed presentation of the evidence that the President is guilty
of impeachable offenses, might nonetheless be reluctant to vote for
conviction if his constituents are significantly less aware than he of
incriminating evidence?" He concludes: "A television spectacle may
well be the lesser of evils."247
The extension of Dellinger's argument would be that a senator
may also hesitate to convict if her constituents were not privy to her
reasons for voting "guilty." The only way to guard against this
240. See Bill Carter, Viewers Tune in for Clinton Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23,1998, at B7.
241. See Howard Kurtz, C-SPAN Urges Open Impeachment: Rules Would Have to
Change To Let Deliberations Be Aired, WASH. POST, Dec. 24,1998, at E7.
242. See Paul Leavitt, End the Trial Now, Public Says in Polls, USA TODAY, Jan. 25,
1999, at 4A (citing results of USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll).
243. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 19 (Yale Univ. Press
1998) (1974).
244. Id. at 20.
245. See supra Part II.E.
246. See Walter E. Dellinger, Spearing the Chief, 83 YALE LJ. 1745, 1750 (1974)
(reviewing CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974)).
247. Id.
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untoward outcome is to publicize the deliberations as well as the rest
of the trial. If indeed a popularly elected President is removed from
office, the people must have confidence the decision was justified.
Even if the deliberations were open, only a limited number of people
could attend. The public would have to rely on the media, acting as
their surrogates.248 But this is a poor substitute. Members of the
press interpret the proceedings through their individual filters.249 The
electorate must be able to see for itself how the decision is reached.
This is only possible if the entire proceedings are televised.
Kay Bailey Hutchison, who argued to open the deliberations,
wrote in her editorial in The Washington Post: "Regardless of how
the Senate decides the articles, open deliberation will give senators
the opportunity to explain their decision to the public in a way that
the printed record-if it becomes public-can never do." 0  She
rightly observed, "Visual images are now woven into the texture of
history that once relied only on the printed word .... We are making
history, and future generations, as much as our own, deserve to know
how we did so.' 251
E. Arguments Against Open Deliberations
Robert Dove, the Senate parliamentarian, advised Chief Justice
Rehnquist to close the deliberations in the Clinton case because the
Senate had always done it that way.252 Rehnquist relied on this
tradition when he ruled against opening the deliberations.253 The
Chief Justice also leaned heavily on rules enacted for the Johnson
impeachment2-4 In 1868, senators were not popularly elected and
thus remained less accountable to the public than they are today. The
evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence during this century has
resulted in the constitutional right of public access to judicial
proceedings. Although an impeachment trial is a quasi-judicial
phenomenon, 55 the potential removal of an elected President
mitigates in favor of increased public scrutiny. Finally, the
development of television has led to greater public expectation of
inclusion in decisions that directly affect the people. Tradition must
give way to these changed circumstances.
A further argument against opening deliberations is that it will
248. See COHN & Dow, supra note 140, at 41,52.
249. See id at 45.
250. Hutchinson, supra note 185, at A19.
251. IL
252. See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. See supra Part H.A.
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discourage candor and the proceeding will degenerate into self-
serving speeches designed to cater to viewing voters. Senators, it is
argued, will be more honest, reasonable and open-minded in
private.26 Closed deliberations allegedly allow them more time to
ponder the ramifications of their decisions before they commit
themselves to an unwise course which would be difficult to reverse
once publicly declared.
It is incumbent upon elected officials to behave in an open,
honest and reasonable manner before their constituents. What a sad
commentary indeed if they must hide behind closed doors to conduct
the nation's most crucial affairs in a forthright fashion. If sunshine
leads to grandstanding, the public will surely see through it. The
weaknesses of those we elect must be exposed, not used as an excuse
to function in secret.
Finally, some senators argued that opening deliberations would
unduly politicize the discussions in the Clinton trial. They feared the
Democrats would use them as a platform to attack Kenneth Starr and
expose unpopular sentiments in favor of Clinton's removal. 57
Alexander Hamilton warned us 200 years ago that impeachments
were by their very nature political.258 It was for that reason the
Founding Fathers lodged the impeachment power in the legislative
branch.259 An inherently political proceeding will become no less so
because it takes place in secret. If partisan and political posturing
occur during deliberations in an impeachment trial, the public must
witness this, not be sheltered from it.
Neither tradition, lack of candor nor politicization provide
justification to continue to enshrine the debate on removing a
President in secrecy.
IV. Change the Rules to Require Open Deliberations
The deliberations in a presidential impeachment trial must be
open to the public. There have been only two such trials-and one
near-trial-in the history of the United States. Although infrequent,
they are momentous historical landmarks. It is incumbent upon the
Senate, in light of the Clinton impeachment, to ensure that senators
in future trials understand the need to open their deliberations.
When Kay Bailey Hutchison raised the issue of rule XX's
apparent presumption for openness with the Chief Justice, he
admitted that rules XX and XXIV do not mandate closed
256. See supra Part II.E.
257. See id.
258. See supra Part II.B.
259. See id.
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deliberations, but only permit them. Rehnquist relied on the official
parliamentarian's interpretation of Senate precedent.26  Since the
Senate had always closed its impeachment deliberations, the
parliamentarian did not question that practice. He ignored the
rebuttable presumption of rule XX for open proceedings, and instead
jumped over to the ambiguous and derivative rule XXIV to justify
Senate tradition.
Rule XX, which was amended for the impeachment trial of
Andrew Johnson, had been clear before the amendment. The pre-
1868 rule read: "At all times, whilst the Senate is sitting upon the trial
of an impeachment the doors of the Senate shall be kept open. '261 In
1868, the following phrase was added to the end of the rule: "unless
the Senate shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon
its decisions. '262 And in a 1986 revision, a final phrase was added to
the rule: "A motion to close the doors may be acted upon without
objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall be voted on
without debate by the yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the
record., 263
The 1868 changes to this rule have effectively forbidden debate
in open session, unless the Senate votes by two-thirds to allow it.264
The motivations for this policy are not known, but likely relate to the
political nature of presidential impeachment. Johnson's
impeachment was a blatantly partisan affair not grounded on a firm
legal foundation.265
There are many reasons to return rule XX to a clear,
unambiguous statement requiring openness at every stage of the
impeachment proceeding. Senators are now popularly elected, not
chosen by state legislatures as they were in 1868.266 Increased
accountability of high government officials has resulted from the
Watergate affair. First Amendment jurisprudence now guarantees
expanded rights of public access to judicial proceedings.267 Although
jury deliberations have traditionally been conducted in secret,
senators sitting in an impeachment trial are not jurors in the
traditional sense. As both the Johnson and Clinton trials clearly
demonstrate, impeachment is intensely political. Yet this is precisely
why the people, to whom the senators are beholden, must have a
260. See p. 367-68 of this article.
261. This rule was number XIX in 1868.
262. See supra Part I.
263. Id
264. In 1929, the Senate codified the procedure that requires a vote of two-thirds of the
senators present to suspend the rules. See supra note 8.
265. See supra Part LD.
266. See supra Part III.A.
267. See supra Parts llI.B. and III.C.
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window into the process by which their President may be removed.
Finally, the technological development of television, unfathomable in
1868, has led to increased public expectations of accessibility. People
can and should be able to witness firsthand the grave act of removing
a President, possibly undoing the results of a popular election. 268
Rule XX of the Rules and Procedures and Practice in the Senate
When Sitting on Impeachment Trials must once again state simply:
"At all times while the Senate is sitting upon the trial of an
impeachment the doors of the Senate shall be kept open." The
following portion of this rule must be removed: "unless the Senate
shall direct the doors to be closed while deliberating upon its
decisions. A motion to close the doors may be acted upon without
objection, or, if objection is heard, the motion shall be voted on
without debate by the yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the
record."
Rule XXIV also acts to forbid debate in open session. 269 It is not
substantive like rule XX, but rather derivative from rule VII, and it
too must be revised. The following phrases in rule XXIV should be
excised: "without debate," "except when the doors shall be closed for
deliberation, and in that case" and "to be had without debate." Rule
XXIV should now read as follows, without the bracketed material:
All the orders and decisions may be acted upon without objection,
or, if objection is heard, the orders and decisions shall be voted on
[without debate] by yeas and nays, which shall be entered on the
record, subject, however, to the operation of Rule VII, [except
when the doors shall be closed for deliberation, and in that case] no
member shall speak more than once on one question, and for not
more than ten minutes on an interlocutory question, and for not
more than fifteen minutes on the final question, unless by consent
of the Senate, [to be had without debate;] but a motion to adjourn
may be decided without the yeas and nays, unless they be
demanded by one-fifth of the members present. The fifteen
minutes herein allowed shall be for the whole deliberation on the
final question, and not on the final question on each article of
impeachment.
The phrase "without debate," which likewise prevents debate on
evidentiary issues with the doors open, must be removed from rule
VII. It should now read, without the bracketed words:
The Presiding Officer of the Senate shall direct all necessary
preparations in the Senate Chamber, and the Presiding Officer on
the trial shall direct all the forms of proceedings while the Senate is
sitting for the purpose of trying an impeachment, and all forms
during the trial not otherwise specially provided for. And the
Presiding Officer on the trial may rule on all questions of evidence
268. See supra Part III.D.
269. See supra Part I.A.
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including, but not limited to, questions of relevancy, materiality,
and redundancy of evidence and incidental questions, which ruling
shall stand as the judgment of the Senate, unless some Member of
the Senate shall ask that a formal vote be taken thereon, in which
case it shall be submitted to the Senate for decision [without
debate]; or he may at his option, in the first instance, submit any
such question to a vote of the Members of the Senate. Upon al
such questions the vote shall be taken in accordance with the
Standing Rules of the Senate.
These changes will result in an unequivocal rule of openness at
every stage of the impeachment procedure, including deliberations.
Let us be clear the next time an American President comes before the
Senate in an impeachment trial. In a representative democracy, the
power resides in the people. They are therefore entitled to see the
entire process by which their President could be removed from office.
* * *
